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The California Controversy Over 
Procuring Employment:  A Case for the 
Personal Managers Act 
Heath B. Zarin* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario:  Annie Artist1 has spent 
her entire life dreaming about becoming a movie actor.  
Spending the last of her money, Annie moves to Los Angeles 
hoping to break into California’s entertainment industry.2  
Amidst the glitz and glamour of Hollywood, she believes 
that nothing can stop her.  Annie, however, soon learns an 
unfortunate truth:  dreams do not easily come true.3 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Professor Andrew B. Sims for his invaluable comments and criticism.  Ad-
ditionally, I extend my deepest gratitude to Kenneth C. Oh, Mark D. Salzberg, 
and H. Peter Nesvold for their insight and encouragement, and to the remaining 
editors of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for 
their tireless efforts.  This Comment is dedicated to my parents for their constant 
love and support. 
1. All names used in this scenario are fictional. 
2. For the purposes of this Comment, the term “entertainment industry” re-
fers to the predominant forms of the entertainment businesses, including music, 
video, television, motion pictures, live theater, and radio. 
 The state of California is a dominant force in the entertainment industry with 
motion pictures, television, music, and other arts constituting a significant part 
of its economy.  See Gary A. Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in Cali-
fornia:  A Legislative Solution, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRY 1993, at 485, 487 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. 
Course Handbook Series No. 359, 1993); James M. O’Brien III, Regulation of At-
torneys Under California’s Talent Agencies Act:  Tautological Approach to Protecting 
Artists, 80 CAL. L. REV. 471, 472 (1992).  The states of Florida and New York, as 
well as the city of Nashville, are also significant bases of entertainment-industry 
activity.  Id.  According to some commentators, upper east Tennessee is develop-
ing into a mini-Hollywood.  Kara Carden, The Region Gets a Slice of Hollywood, 
BUS. J. UPPER E. TENN. & SOUTHWEST VA., Nov. 1995, at 40. 
3. Many aspiring artists arrive in Los Angeles with dreams of stardom that 
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Annie spends her first few weeks in Los Angeles trying 
to “get her foot in the door,” but her efforts are an exercise in 
futility.  She therefore decides to change her game plan, and 
spends the next several weeks trying to find a talent agent4 
willing to represent her.5  Unfortunately, every talent 
agency6 recites the same line in response to her request for 
representation:  “Sorry, we don’t represent unestablished 
artists.”  Persistent, Annie continues the struggle to find 
work, but without a talent agent, she continues to encounter 
only closed doors. 
Distressed by her string of failures, Annie contemplates 
returning home to her parents.  She is, however, unable to 
scrounge up enough money to buy a bus ticket home, so she 
drops seventy cents into an opened suitcase and begins to 
perform a scene from Romeo and Juliet on Santa Monica’s 
Third Street Promenade. 
As Manny Jerre, a personal manager,7 ambles along the 
                                                                                                                                  
are never fulfilled.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481.  These artists are in desperate 
need of help from representatives in the industry.  Id.  Some artists, however, 
have been able to achieve overnight success.  See, e.g., Michael Owen, Catherine, 
So Far Beyond the Fringe, EVENING STANDARD, Oct. 4, 1996, at 29 (describing ac-
tress Catherine McCormack’s apparent overnight success). 
4. Talent agents seek employment for their artist-clients.  Greenberg, supra 
note 2, at 488; see discussion infra part I.A.1 (describing the talent agent’s role in 
the entertainment industry). 
5. Unestablished artists have great difficulty finding agents willing to repre-
sent them.  See, e.g., Robert Simonson, How to Contact Agents Effectively by Mail; 
Postal Tips for Actors Trying to Find Agents, BACK STAGE, Nov. 29, 1996, at 24 (ex-
plaining that Penny Luedke, an agent with the Gilchrist Talent Group, believes 
that an inexperienced artist’s attempts to obtain an agent are futile). 
6. Talent agencies organize the efforts of many talent agents to better serve 
the interests of their artist-clients.  See discussion infra part I.A.1 (explaining why 
talent agencies rarely represent aspiring artists). 
7. Personal managers advise, counsel, direct, and coordinate the develop-
ment of their artist-clients’ careers.  See HOWARD SIEGEL, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 
485, 491 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SIEGEL I]; Howard Siegel, Personal Management, 
in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1989, at 137, 144 (PLI 
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 
268, 1989) [hereinafter Siegel II]; Hal I. Gilenson, Badlands:  Artist-Personal Man-
ager Conflicts of Interest in the Music Industry, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 509 
(1991); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482; David A. Steinberg & Yakub Hazzard, “Em-
ployment Services” May Trigger Act, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 25, 1996, at B7; Personal Man-
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promenade, Annie’s performance catches his eye.  Capti-
vated by Annie’s raw acting abilities, Manny introduces 
himself to the aspiring actress and explains how he can help 
her become a star.  He tells her, “With my help, you could be 
the next Julia Roberts.  But, you will need formal training.” 
Hearing this, Annie begins to worry.  She can barely 
support herself, let alone afford acting lessons.  Manny, 
however, quickly assuages her anxiety with soothing words:  
“Don’t worry kid.  I’ll pay for your lessons, and I’ll lend you 
money to live on until we hit the big time.”  Annie smiles 
with relief, thinking that her “break” finally, after several 
long weeks, had come. 
Soon thereafter, Annie and Manny enter into a personal 
management agreement.8  The agreement provides that 
Manny will advise, counsel, and direct Annie in the devel-
opment of her acting career.  In return for Manny’s services, 
Annie agrees to pay him twenty percent of her income for 
five years.  Both Manny and Annie enter into the agreement 
with the mutual hope that Annie will be successful. 
For the next six months, Manny pays for Annie’s acting 
lessons and living expenses as he tries, without success, to 
find a talent agent willing to represent the promising actress.  
Manny also helps Annie to regain her self-esteem, telling 
her, “I’ve changed my mind.  You’re not going to be the next 
Julia Roberts; you’re going to be bigger!” 
One day, Manny calls Annie with great news:  “Last 
night, I had dinner with a movie-producer who is looking 
for a fresh face for his next project.  I told him about you, 
showed him your picture, and he agreed to let you audition 
                                                                                                                                  
agers Must Be Licensed as Talent Agents in California if They Seek Employment for 
Their Clients, Even if Seeking Employment Is Only an “Incidental” Activity, California 
Court of Appeal Rules; Earlier, Contrary Ruling by Another Panel of the Same Court is 
Rejected as “Incorrect Dicta,” ENT. L. REP., July 1996 [hereinafter Licensing Personal 
Managers]. 
8. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing personal management agree-
ments). 
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for the starring role.”  The following week, Annie auditions 
and receives the lead role. 
The movie is a tremendous success and Annie begins the 
ascent to stardom.  Suddenly, talent agents are begging her 
to accept their services.  No longer needing Manny’s assis-
tance, Annie wants to escape the management agreement to 
avoid paying him twenty percent of her income.  Upon the 
advice of her more-established actor friends, she files a com-
plaint with California’s Labor Commission,9 requesting that 
it declare her agreement with Manny void.  In her complaint, 
Annie alleges that Manny acted as an unlicensed talent agent 
when he arranged her audition,10 because under California 
law, only licensed talent agents may perform such services.11  
The Labor Commissioner12 agrees with Annie’s complaint 
and rules that Manny unlawfully procured employment for 
Annie by securing her an audition. 
As the above scenario demonstrates, if a personal man-
ager procures employment for an artist-client without first 
obtaining an agency license, the Labor Commissioner has the 
authority to declare the management agreement void.13  
 
9. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (discussing California Labor Commis-
sioner). 
10. Talent agent services include negotiating deals and procuring employ-
ment for artists.  SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 486; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 507; see 
discussion infra part I.A.1 (describing services provided by talent agents).  Under 
certain circumstances, personal managers will perform talent agent services for 
artist-clients.  Fred Jelin, The Personal Manager Controversy:  Carving the Turf, in 
COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1993, at 471, 473 (PLI Pats., 
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 359, 
1993); Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 507; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 483-84. 
11. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 488; Jelin, supra note 10, at 477; O’Brien, 
supra note 2, at 471; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510.  As one commentator notes, 
California law distinguishes the licensing requirements of talent agents from 
personal managers:  an agent must obtain a license, while a manager need not.  
Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7; see discussion infra part I.A (describing 
talent agents and personal managers). 
12. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (discussing California Labor Commis-
sioner). 
13. See discussion infra part I.C.2.c (describing Labor Commissioner’s power 
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Consequently, acting as an unlicensed talent agent can have 
disastrous results;14 anyone who crosses the line of pro-
curement and engages in regulated agency activities may 
face harsh penalties.15  In Annie’s case, the Labor Commis-
sioner would likely declare the contract void, order Manny 
to return all commissions that he received from Annie, and 
relieve Annie’s liability to Manny for her loans. 
This scenario is a personal manager’s nightmare.  To pro-
tect artists, California’s Talent Agencies Act (“TAA”)16 pro-
hibits unlicensed individuals from procuring employment 
for artists.17  Most personal managers, however, need to en-
gage in employment procurement activities when represent-
ing their clients.18  Personal managers perform an indispen-
sable role in developing artists’ careers,19 and this 
prohibition deters individuals from functioning as personal 
managers because of the potentially disastrous conse-
quences.20  Because personal managers must engage in pro-
curement activities to provide effective service to their cli-
ents, the prohibition against such conduct should be 
removed.21  The legislature should alter California law to 
protect artists and to encourage people to enter the personal 
                                                                                                                                  
to fashion remedies under the Talent Agencies Act. 
14. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 486-87; Jelin, supra 10, at 473; Greenberg, supra 
note 2, at 503. 
15. The penalties for engaging in agency activities without a license include 
forfeiture of commissions, repayment of past fees, loss of future earnings, and 
invalidation of management and collateral agreements.  SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 
486-87; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 474; see discus-
sion infra part I.C.2.c (describing the penalties administered for violations of 
California’s talent agency laws). 
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997). 
17. See discussion infra part I.C.2.a (describing purposes behind the TAA). 
18. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing why most personal managers 
engage in procurement activities). 
19. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing unique role played by personal 
manager in developing artist’s career). 
20. See discussion infra part I.C.2.c (describing penalties individuals may re-
ceive for violating TAA). 
21. Jelin, supra note 10, at 473; see discussion infra part III.B (advocating that 
the California legislature enact a Personal Managers Act). 
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management profession.22 
In contrast to California law, New York law recognizes 
that personal managers need to procure employment for 
their clients.23  Because New York employs an incidental 
booking exception,24 Manny would not be penalized for in-
cidental procurement efforts in New York.25  Under that 
state’s law, personal managers may engage in incidental 
procurement efforts on behalf of their clients without obtain-
ing an agency license.26  Commentators contend that Cali-
fornia should take notice of New York’s “sensible” approach 
to regulating personal managers and “follow suit.”27 
Examining how Annie’s dispute would unfold in New 
York underscores how the unregulated status of personal 
managers in California continues to present the personal 
manager with a dilemma.28  Current California legislation 
regulates individuals who procure employment, which in 
California is legally limited to talent agents.29  The conflict 
arises because California law’s distinction between personal 
managers and talent agents ignores reality:  the day-to-day 
activities of many managers may be considered procure-
ment, and thus subject them to harsh penalties for violating 
the licensing requirement.30  Personal managers often must 
procure employment when representing an aspiring enter-
tainer, in whose success the manager invests both emotion-
 
22. See discussion infra part II.B (describing possible solutions to this prob-
lem, such as an incidental booking exception and a Personal Managers Act). 
23. See discussion infra part I.D.1 (describing how New York’s incidental 
booking exception permits personal managers to procure employment). 
24. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997). 
25. See discussion infra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental booking 
exception). 
26. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8). 
27. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509. 
28. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (describing TAA’s indirect regulation of 
personal managers). 
29. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (discussing TAA’s regulation of individu-
als who procure employment for artists); see discussion infra part I.A.1 (discuss-
ing talent agent’s procurement functions for artists). 
30. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 484-85. 
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ally and financially.31  The personal manager must obtain an 
agent’s license or act in possible violation of the TAA.32  In 
light of the important and distinctive role personal managers 
play in the entertainment industry, legislation is necessary to 
expressly govern personal managers. 
This Comment argues that California should allow per-
sonal managers to procure employment for artists when 
such procurement is incidental to the manager’s managerial 
responsibilities.33  Part I discusses the various duties and re-
sponsibilities of talent agents and personal managers, and 
describes the regulation of personal representatives in Cali-
fornia and New York.  Part II outlines the conflict in Califor-
nia law concerning whether or not unlicensed personal 
managers can procure employment under the TAA.  Specifi-
cally, Part II discusses two cases decided in the California 
Court of Appeals that have interpreted the TAA differently, 
and proposes solutions to the conflict.  Part II considers 
amending the TAA to include an incidental booking excep-
tion and analyzes whether California should enact a Per-
sonal Managers Act (“PMA”) to expressly govern personal 
managers.  Part III argues that the California Legislature 
should enact a PMA that incorporates an incidental booking 
exception to the TAA.  Drafted in this manner, the PMA 
would align California law with the entertainment industry 
reality.  The PMA would also provide artists and managers 
with a definitive statement of their obligations.  Accordingly, 
this Comment concludes that the California Legislature 
should enact a PMA because such legislation would protect 
both artists and personal managers, without compromising 
 
31. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (setting forth personal manager’s engage-
ment in procurement of employment when representing aspiring artists). 
32. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 484-85.  According to one commentator, per-
sonal managers must engage in procurement efforts.  Id.  Because procurement 
activities require licensing as a talent agent, if a personal manager wishes to per-
form his job, he must obtain an agency license or act as an unlicensed agent.  Id. 
at 485. 
33. See discussion infra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking exception). 
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the quality of representation that artists receive. 
I. THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
Part I presents the background information necessary to 
understand the conflict regarding whether the TAA requires 
personal managers to obtain talent agency licenses before 
procuring employment for artist-clients.  First, this part in-
troduces the roles and responsibilities of two key entertain-
ment industry representatives—talent agents and personal 
managers.  Second, this part discusses management agree-
ments.  Third, it delineates California’s regulation of the en-
tertainment industry.  Finally, this part contrasts California 
law with New York’s regulation of its entertainment indus-
try. 
A. Entertainment Industry Representatives 
In the entertainment industry, professional representa-
tives plan most business deals.34  This section examines the 
roles performed by two of the most important industry 
players, the talent agent and the personal manager. 
1. Talent Agents 
A talent agent’s primary task is to procure employment 
for his client by marketing the artist’s talents and skills 
throughout the entertainment industry.35  Talent agents 
 
34. See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTER-
TAINMENT INDUSTRIES 1 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that most business deals in the 
entertainment industry are undertaken by intermediaries). 
35. Id. at 3 (stating that agents actively seek employment for artists in the 
entertainment industry); Luaine L. Quast, Musicians, Their Representatives, and the 
Agreements Between Them, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS 
HANDBOOK 191, 192 (John D. Viera & Robert Thorne eds., 1991); Adam B. Nimoy, 
Personal Managers and the California Talent Agencies Act:  For Whom the Bill Toils, 2 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 145, 147 (1982); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 478 (citing DAVID 
BASKERVILLE, MUSIC BUSINESS HANDBOOK & CAREER GUIDE 150 (3d ed. 1982); Li-
censing Personal Managers, supra note 7; Kenneth J. Abdo, Agents, Managers, and 
Lawyers:  A Roadmap for the Entertainment Industry, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3 
(1996). 
   
1997] THE PERSONAL MANAGERS ACT 935 
function as brokers between talent-sellers and talent-buyers 
by finding and negotiating offers36 of employment on behalf 
of the artist.37  Additionally, an agent may serve as a buyer 
of talent by securing a client for an appearance in the agent’s 
own productions.38 
Although talent agents are compensated for representing 
artists, they rarely represent aspiring artists.39  In general, 
this is because talent agents will represent an artist only if a 
sufficient economic return is likely;40 not surprisingly, agents 
profit more from representing established artists than from 
representing the “unknowns.”41 
 
36. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; BASKERVILLE, supra note 35, at 150; 
Bernard Weinraub, They Just Want a Little Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at 4-
5; see also Abdo, supra note 35, at 3 (declaring that agents negotiate deals between 
“producers, directors, writers, and actors”).  The talent agent’s job is to deliver 
his artists to talent buyers—producers, record companies, publishers, packagers, 
promoters, and club owners— and thus find work for his client.  See BIEDERMAN, 
supra note 35, at 2; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; Weinraub, supra, at 5. 
37. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 478-79; see also Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; Debbie 
Hanson, Connections Pay Off in the Entertainment Business, CENTRAL PENN BUS. J., 
Nov. 1, 1996, at 6 (quoting Gary Swartz, an agent, as saying, “[t]he biggest benefit 
in using an agent . . . is that all of the paperwork, contract signing and details be-
come the agent’s problem”). 
38. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 479.  Agents, however, must be cautious of pos-
sible violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  See Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 
1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). 
39. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490.  For a list of Hollywood’s top talent 
agencies and their respective client lists, see Elaine Dutka, Hollywood; The Big 
Four, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1996, at 82. 
40. Quast, supra note 35, at 203; Jim Seavor, Learn How to Find an Agent to Sell 
Your Act, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Aug. 28, 1996, at 2E. 
41. Quast, supra note 35, at 191; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 480; see also James 
Bates, Big Movie Stars Get Big Salaries, Big Executives Whine—Big Deal, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 1996, at D1 (reporting that records were shattered when motion picture 
stars Sylvester Stallone, Jim Carrey, John Travolta, and Tom Hanks surpassed 
the $20-million-a-film benchmark).  Established artists do not necessarily need 
the services of a talent agent.  See generally Claudia Eller, After 15 Years, Schwar-
zenegger Tells ICM:  ‘I Won’t Be Back,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1997, at D4 (noting that 
“[t]he financial loss of a star as big as Arnold Schwarzenegger, one of the high-
est-paid actors in the world, is significant to a talent agency, which normally re-
ceives 10% of a client’s fee on every project”); Claudia Eller, Does Kevin Costner 
Need an Agent?  Industry Types Weigh In, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at D6 (discuss-
ing whether established artists need agent services). 
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Talent agents engage in an extremely risky practice:  they 
provide services to an artist, and are rewarded only when 
the artist achieves some degree of success.  To compensate 
for this risk, agreements between artists and talent agents 
usually include an exclusivity clause.42  Furthermore, a talent 
agent will often seek to extend the representation of an artist 
to include all forms of entertainment, thereby guaranteeing 
the agent a percentage of all of the artists’ total income.43  Fi-
nally, talent agents often charge large fees, typically ranging 
from ten to twenty percent of an artist’s gross earnings.44 
All talent agents are regulated by state statutes and enter-
tainment unions,45 and must obtain agency licenses under 
California law.46  In order to preclude inequitable contracts, 
California’s Labor Commission limits an agent’s commission 
 
42. Quast, supra note 35, at 202-03 (claiming that exclusivity is essential to 
every industry relationship).  Consequently, agreements between agents and art-
ists typically include an exclusivity clause.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 479.  Talent 
agents often want the exclusive right to negotiate engagements for their clients.  
Stan Soocher, How to Negotiate Concert Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 20, 1995, at 5. 
43. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 479; see also Quast, supra note 35, at 203 (stating 
that agents wish to represent artists in all forms of artistic and commercial en-
deavors).  Through agency agreements, talent agents can guarantee themselves a 
portion of any compensation received by their clients.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 
479. 
44. JOSEPH TAUBMAN, IN TUNE WITH THE MUSIC BUSINESS 84 (1st ed. 1980); see 
also BASKERVILLE, supra note 35, at 151; 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY, LINDEY ON 
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 14: A(3) (2d ed. 1990); BIEDERMAN, 
supra note 35, at 2; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; Soocher, supra note 42, at 5; Hanson, 
supra note 36, at 6. 
45. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 172 (McKinney 
1988 & Supp. 1997); American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Regu-
lations Governing Agents, Rule 12-B, § XX, at 21-22 (1971); Screen Actors Guild 
Agency Regulations, Amended Rule 16(g), § XI, at 18-23 (1968); Constitution By-
Laws and Policy of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States 
and Canada, art. XXIII, § 8, at 130 (rev. ed. 1981). 
46. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (stating that “[n]o person shall engage in or 
carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license there-
for from the Labor Commissioner”).  California law requires that individuals en-
gaging in agency activities have talent agency licenses, Abdo, supra note 35, at 3, 
which are obtained from the state. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4.  Consequently, 
in California, licensed talent agents are the only individuals who may participate 
in employment procurement activities.  Soocher, supra note 42, at 5. 
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generally to twenty-five percent of gross compensation.47  It 
is through such regulations that the entertainment industry 
effectively denies employment procurement services to 
those who are in greatest need of such services—the unrep-
resented aspiring artist.48 
2. Personal Managers 
In contrast to a talent agent, a personal manager’s pri-
mary responsibilities include advising, counseling, and di-
recting the development of the artist’s career.49  Personal 
managers handle both the day-to-day activities and the long-
term strategies of an artist’s career development.50  They ar-
range the artist’s interactions with other personal represen-
tatives,51 and routinely finance, or obtain financing for, com-
 
47. STAFF OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS, 1982 
REGULAR SESS., STAFF ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 997 1 (1982) [hereinafter STAFF 
ANALYSIS]; Donna G. Cole-Wallen, Crossing the Line:  Issues Facing Entertainment 
Attorneys Engaged in Secondary Occupations, 8 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 481, 521 
n.218 (1986). 
48. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 480. 
49. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; see, e.g., SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 491; 
Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 486-87; Nimoy, supra note 35, at 147.  According to 
Ed Morgan of Black Park Management, “[the manager’s] ultimate goal is to help 
create opportunities . . . to make and build a career.”  Ray Waddell, Panel:  Artist-
Manager Relationship Requires Much Careful Consideration, AMUSEMENT BUS., Apr. 
1, 1996, at 8.  Furthermore, personal managers serve as career advisors in all 
business affairs, from daily management to career development.  Abdo, supra 
note 35, at 3. 
50. Gilenson, supra note 7, at 509. 
51. Jelin, supra note 10, at 475; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482.  Most artists 
have a team of personal representatives working on their behalf.  See Celeb PR is 
All Business, Says Pros, Who Scoff at Starry Image, O’DWYER’S PR SERVS. REP., Jan. 
1997, at 82 (quoting Thomas Tardio, Chairman of Shandwick’s Rogers & Cowan 
entertainment unit, as saying “[e]veryone has a talent agent, a business manager, 
and a personal manager, that are part of the team of deciding the next PR 
move”).  The personal manager’s role includes helping clients build a profes-
sional team consisting of attorneys and accountants.  Waddell, supra note 49, at 8.  
Consequently, established artists usually have a team of advisors:  an agent, a 
personal manager, a business manager, and an attorney.  BIEDERMAN, supra note 
35, at 1; see also Gary Greenberg, Crossing the Thin Line Between Manager and At-
torney in the Entertainment Industry, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 7, 7 (1996) (noting that 
an artist’s team of representatives usually includes a personal manager, a talent 
agent, a business manager, a publicist, and an attorney).  Artists may employ a 
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pletion of the artist’s product.52  In addition, personal man-
agers usually handle the artist’s finances until the artist has 
earned sufficient funds to require the services of a separate 
business manager.53 
                                                                                                                                  
number of attorneys, such as a transactional attorney, a litigator, a corporate at-
torney, and an intellectual property attorney.  Id. at 7 n.1. 
52. TAUBMAN, supra note 44, at 34; SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 493; Greenberg, 
supra note 2, at 490; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 509.  Personal managers may own 
production firms.  Lisa Gubernick & Robert La Franco, “We Can Own,” FORBES, 
Sept. 25, 1995, at 156 (stating that because managers do not have talent agent li-
censes, they are unaffected by the Justice Department ruling that separates talent 
agencies and production studios).   
 A manager, who also produces his clients’ projects, will serve as “a strategic 
planner, marketing man, accountant and babysitter.”  Id. at 156.  The manager 
will try not to leave any aspect of his clients’ popularity unexploited.  Id.  Man-
agers view their clients as “one-man industries:  T shirts, records, videos, en-
dorsements, movie deals and commercial contracts.”  Id.  For example, Bernie 
Brillstein and Brad Grey own Brillstein-Grey, a multimillion-dollar management 
and production company funded by ABC.  Id.  When management owns a pro-
duction company, management will seek to produce their clients’ projects.  
Thomas Tyrer, Talent/Production Firm In Works, ELEC. MEDIA, Sept. 11, 1995, at 40 
(quoting Scott Siegler, former president of Columbia Pictures Television and 
partner in MediaFour, a talent management and production firm, “[i]t’s a logical 
extension in managing talent to be able to take it all the way through the fruition 
of the production rather than just lead them to the door”).  In addition, artists 
benefit from management firms that can also produce.  Id. at 40.  Furthermore, 
agents are frustrated because they are not allowed to produce.  Gubernick & La 
Franco, supra, at 156. 
53. Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 490; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 
30 (noting that a business manager is not required early in an artist’s career).  
Generally, an accountant or lawyer may serve as the business manager. SIEGEL I, 
supra note 7, at 486; Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 490; Ted Johnson, VARIETY, 
Sept. 16, 1996, at 87.  Typically, the business manager, however, is a certified 
public accountant.  BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; 
Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7.   
 Celebrity business managers receive as much as five percent of a client’s in-
come, while conventional financial advisors perform similar services for com-
missions of one percent.  See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; Johnson, supra, at 87.  
Competition from personal bankers has forced some business managers to lower 
their rates or even accept hourly payments.  Id.  Nevertheless, business managers 
feel that higher fees are justified because they provide a more personal level of 
service.  Id.  Business managers may pay personal bills, help pick out new cars, 
and advise clients on which schools their children should attend.  Id.; see also 
BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2 (noting that business manager’s functions include 
simple accounting services, paying the client’s bills, advising on investments, 
running tours, and other complicated matters).  Furthermore, business managers 
are very close with clients and their families.  Johnson, supra, at 87 (quoting busi-
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Artists usually employ personal managers in addition to 
talent agents.54  While personal managers do provide aspir-
ing artists with much needed business acumen and industry 
contacts,55 industry newcomers engage personal managers 
before talent agents only because they are unable to find tal-
ent agents willing to represent them.56  Additionally, per-
sonal managers often suggest that their knowledge and con-
tacts can improve the artist’s chances for success,57 and 
might even imply that their guidance will lead the artist to 
stardom.58 
The personal manager differs from the talent agent be-
cause a personal manager’s duties include both business and 
personal concerns.59  Personal managers, speculating on the 
artists’ success, frequently lend their aspiring clients 
money,60 and often become the artists’ friends and confi-
                                                                                                                                  
ness manager, Barbara Carswell, as saying, “I’ve been in the hospital room when 
a client died . . . I went with the family to help pick out the coffin.  I don’t know 
how much closer you can get”).  Consequently, business managers are privy to 
the most intimate details of their clients’ financial lives.  BIEDERMAN, supra note 
35, at 41; see generally ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 990 
(2d Cir. 1983) (discussing business managers’ strong fiduciary obligations to 
their clients). 
54. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481; Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7; John Brodie 
& Kathleen O’Steen, Antsy Agents Make Mutant Managers, VARIETY, Mar. 20, 1995, 
at 1. 
55. In the early stages of an artist’s career, the manager must educate the 
artist about the entertainment industry.  Waddell, supra note 49, at 8.  Usually, 
artists do not understand how their careers are going to develop.  Id. 
56. LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14:D(2); Quast, supra note 35, at 191 (stating that 
personal managers are the only representatives that an aspiring musician can af-
ford to hire); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481 (noting that talent agents rarely repre-
sent aspiring artists). 
57. LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14:D(2); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481. 
58. LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14:D(2); Michael McLeod, Kid, I’m Gonna Make 
You a Star; In Some Cases, That Proves To Be True.  In Others, It’s Just a Line.  Take a 
Peek Behind The Glamour and Glitz, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Apr. 7, 1996, at 6. 
59. Jelin, supra note 10, at 475; Waddell, supra note 49, at 8; Gilenson, supra 
note 7, at 508; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that managers 
get intimately involved with career development and creating their client’s pub-
lic image); Ann A. Pantoga, Personal Managers Must Be Licensed if They Procure 
Employment for Artist, 6 J. ART & ENT. L. 327 (1996) (stating that personal manag-
ers deal with both personal and business matters). 
60. Quast, supra note 35, at 198.  Managers may invest their own money into 
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dants.61  In addition, personal managers might nurture the 
artists’ personal relationships,62 receive telephone calls at 
any time,63 or even pick up the artists’ laundry.64  By orga-
nizing their clients’ business and personal lives, personal 
managers free the artists from day-to-day concerns, allowing 
them to concentrate on creative tasks.65  Thus, the personal 
manager plays a unique role in an artist’s development and 
success.66 
B. Management Agreements 
Management agreements set forth the personal man-
ager’s obligations to the artist.67  The agreements are usually 
                                                                                                                                  
an act during the early stages of the client’s career.  Waddell, supra note 49, at 8.  
Managers may also speculate on an artist’s success by “partnering with the per-
sonality in making movies, records or TV shows.”  Gubernick & La Franco, supra 
note 52, at 156. 
61. Personal managers may become so close, in fact, that they serve as a cli-
ent’s alter ego.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482 (citing Quast, supra note 35, at 198); 
Waddell, supra note 49, at 8 (quoting Paula Sartorious of Side One Management, 
as stating that “[a] manager is with an artist every single day, almost like a mar-
riage . . . the artist has to ask himself, ‘Can I deal with this person every day, can 
I trust this person?’”). 
62. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482 (citing Quast, supra note 35, at 198). 
63. See WAYNE WADHAMS, SOUND ADVICE:  THE MUSICIAN’S GUIDE TO THE 
RECORD INDUSTRY 76 (1990) (relating a manager’s story about a phone call from 
the Georgia State Police after his artist-client was picked up “for throwing fire-
crackers out the back of [a] van at 6: 00 a.m. while doing 90 mph on Route 95 
South”); see also Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7 (noting that personal management 
can be a thankless job occupied by late night phone calls and detail-oriented 
days). 
64. Baskerville, supra note 35, at 154. 
65. Personal managers give their clients time to be artists. O’Brien, supra 
note 2, at 483. 
66. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8; see also Greenberg, supra note 51, at 8. 
67. See Quast, supra note 35, at 207.  Commonly offered services include:  
(1) advice and counsel in the selection of literary, artistic, and musical 
material; 
(2) advice and counsel in publicity, public relations, and advertising; 
(3) advice and counsel in choosing a proper format to showcase the art-
ist’s talents and in determining mood, style, setting, etc.; 
(4) advice and counsel in selecting artistic collaborative talent; 
(5) advice and counsel with regard to general practices in the enter-
tainment industry as a whole; 
(6) advice and counsel concerning the selection and direction of agents, 
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for a term of three to five years,68 and typically contain ex-
clusivity clauses similar to those found in agency contracts.69 
Personal managers usually earn a commission of ten to 
fifty percent of the artist’s gross receipts, as compared to the 
standard ten percent received by talent agents.70  They jus-
tify their high fees by enduring greater risks than talent 
agents.71  Personal managers invest a considerable amount 
of time and money in the long-term development of an un-
known artist’s career, and therefore charge higher fees to 
cover their expenses.72 
Neither statutory nor entertainment-union regulations 
expressly govern the personal manager’s activities and com-
pensation.73  By procuring employment, however, personal 
                                                                                                                                  
business managers, and other management personnel. 
Id.; see also SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 491-93 (stating that personal managers are 
expected to advise the artist in all facets of the artist’s career, including:  select-
ing material, selecting costumes, selecting personnel, selecting the proper vehi-
cle, personal management, representation with third parties, and providing 
funds); Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7 (stating that standard management agree-
ments require the manager to advise and counsel the artist concerning the gen-
eral practices in the entertainment industry with regard to compensation and 
privileges, and in connection with negotiating agreements); Id. at 7 n.5 (suggest-
ing that other services required by a typical management agreement are to ad-
vise and counsel:  (1) in the selection of literary, artistic, and musical material; (2) 
in matters regarding publicity; (3) with respect to adopting a proper format for 
presenting the artist’s talent; (4) in selecting artistic talent to accompany the art-
ist’s presentation; (5) with respect to selecting talent agencies and any other rep-
resentatives engaged to counsel and advise the artist and to seek and procure 
employment engagements for the artist; and (6) to the extent permitted by law, 
to obtain employment for the artist as a recording artist). 
68. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8.  However, a recent trend in the recording 
industry is to base contract length on album cycles.  Id. 
69. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482; see discussion supra part I.A.1 (discussing 
the artist-agent relationship).  For examples of management agreements, see 
LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14: D-2.01; SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 505-72.  Typically, the 
management agreement emphasizes the personal manager’s interests.  LINDEY, 
supra note 44, § 14:D(2); Gilenson, supra note 7, at 503-04. 
70. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 1; see, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 51, at 
8; Quast, supra note 35, at 199; Waddell, supra note 49, at 8; Abdo, supra note 35, 
at 3. 
71. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483. 
72. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 1; Quast, supra note 35, at 199. 
73. Abdo, supra note 35, at 4; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (stating 
   
942 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:927 
managers may become subject to the standards that govern 
talent agents because those rules regulate employment pro-
curement activities.74  As a result, to avoid the appearance of 
acting as an unlicensed talent agent, many personal man-
agement contracts include clauses explicitly stating that they 
will not procure employment.75 
Personal managers insist that the restriction against their 
procuring employment for clients ignores an entertainment 
industry reality:  that “any personal manager worth his or 
her commission partakes in some manner in procuring or at-
tempting to procure employment for his or her clients.”76  
Thus, personal managers in California face a dilemma:  they 
can continue unlicensed procurement activities and risk be-
ing penalized by the Labor Commissioner,77 or they can ob-
tain talent-agency licenses and subject themselves to state 
and union regulation.78 
C. Entertainment Industry Regulation in California 
In California, the entertainment industry constitutes a 
significant part of the state’s economy.79  To protect the in-
terests of those involved in the industry, the California legis-
lature has created a highly detailed regulatory system.80  
Additionally, the entertainment unions and guilds also regu-
late the industry to protect their artist-members.81  This sec-
tion examines how both California’s TAA and the enter-
                                                                                                                                  
that the California statute does not expressly grant jurisdiction over unlicensed 
agents). 
74. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that the Labor Commission 
has jurisdiction over individuals performing agency functions); Abdo, supra note 
35, at 4 (stating that unlicensed representatives are subject to regulation). 
75. Gilenson, supra note 7, at 511. 
76. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84; see also Abdo, supra note 35, at 3 (ac-
knowledging that managers must procure employment for clients). 
77. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4 (explaining that acting as an unli-
censed agent can lead to severe consequences). 
78. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 484. 
79. Id. at 472. 
80. BIEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 12. 
81. See id. at 25; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4. 
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tainment guilds and unions regulate the entertainment in-
dustry.  It concludes with an examination of the California 
cases that have laid the foundation for the controversy over 
procuring employment. 
1. California’s Talent Agencies Act 
California regulates the entertainment industry through 
the TAA, a complex remedial statute.82  This sub-section ex-
amines the purpose and legislative history of the TAA and 
describes how the TAA regulates the industry.  Addition-
ally, it discusses the remedies that may be administered 
when a violation occurs.  This sub-section concludes with an 
analysis of the TAA’s ambiguous language. 
a. Purpose and Legislative History 
The California legislature enacted the TAA to protect art-
ists seeking employment in California’s entertainment in-
dustry from the unscrupulous practices of agents.83  The is-
sue of whether artists need protection arose when the 
California legislature learned that talent agents were engag-
ing in inappropriate actions, such as sending female artists 
to houses of prostitution,84 sending artists to dangerous loca-
tions, arranging for minors to work in bars, and splitting fees 
with owners or managers of the venues that booked their 
artists.85  These actions prompted remedial legislation, in the 
 
82. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.00-.47; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 12 
(suggesting that California has a detailed legislative system of regulation). 
83. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 493 (citing Licensing and Regulation of Artists 
Managers, Personal Managers, and Musicians Booking Agencies:  Hearings Before the 
California Legislature Senate Comm. on Industrial Relations 222 (1975) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (testimony of Albert Reyff, Asst. State Labor Comm’r)); Jelin, supra 
note 10, at 476; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4; Miles E. Locker, Enforce-
ment of the California Talent Agencies Act:  The Procedures of the Labor Commissioner, 
14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 11, 30 (1996); Pantoga, supra note 50, at 327. 
84. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 493 (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 28-29 (tes-
timony of Roger Davis, First Vice Pres. of the Artists’ Managers Guild)). 
85. Quast, supra note 35, at 193; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 480.  While the ra-
tionale for restricting an agent’s ability to send artists to dangerous places or to 
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form of an amendment to the Private Employment Agencies 
Law of 1913,86 that regulated talent agents87 and prohibited 
them from engaging in such activities.88 
Through this amendment, talent agents were brought 
under the Labor Commissioner’s jurisdiction.89  In 1959, the 
legislature enacted a new chapter of the Labor Code unique 
to the issues and concerns related to artists’ representa-
tives—the Artists’ Managers Act.90  In 1978, the Artists’ 
Managers Act became the TAA.91 
In 1982, the legislature added three significant amend-
ments to the TAA,92 subject to “sunset provisions,”93 
                                                                                                                                  
send minors to bars is obvious, further explanation of “fee splitting” may be nec-
essary to show the justification for its prohibition.  Fee splitting occurs when an 
agent pays money to an employer of talent in exchange for the employer’s prom-
ise to hire only artists represented by that agent.  Hearings, supra note 83, at A-6 
(statement of Walter L.M. Lorimer, an attorney who participated in drafting the 
Artists Managers Bill in 1959).  The agent books his artists into the employer’s 
venue, collects a commission from the artist, and turns over part of the commis-
sion to the employer.  Id. 
86. 1913 Cal. Stat. 515, amended by 1923 Cal. Stat. 936. 
87. The TAA is an example of interest-group politics trumping legislative 
integrity.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 493 n.138.  The TAA progressed to its present 
form in slow stages directed by interested parties, bargained amendments, and 
industry debate.  Id. 
88. Id. at 493. 
89. Id. at 493-94.  The TAA originated with the Artists’ Managers Act of 
1943, which allowed personal managers to procure employment for artists as 
part of their duties as an adviser and counselor.  Steinberg & Hazzard, supra note 
7, at B7. 
90. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494.  Talent agents lobbied for the changes, 
complaining that they were subject to rules not specifically promulgated to regu-
late them.  Id. (citing Letter from John F. Henning, Director of the California De-
partment of Industrial Relation, to Julian Beck, Legislative Secretary, Governor’s 
Office (May 28, 1959)). 
91. Id.  In contrast to the Artists’ Managers Act, the TAA “focuses on per-
sons engaged in the occupation of procuring employment or engagements for an 
artist.”  Steinberg & Hazzard, supra note 7, at B7. 
92. The significant changes benefited personal managers.  Jelin, supra note 
10, at 480. 
93. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494; see also Richard L. Feller, California’s Revised 
Talent Agencies Act:  Fine-Tuning the Regulation of Employment Procurement in the 
Entertainment Industry, 5 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3 (1986) (stating that sunset provi-
sions were supposed to delete the three major modifications made to the TAA).  
“Sunset provisions” set legislation to terminate on a specified date unless rein-
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changed the TAA in three significant ways:  (1) allowing 
unlicensed individuals to act in concert with, and at the re-
quest of, licensed talent agents in negotiating employment 
contracts;94 (2) exempting the procurement of recording con-
tracts from regulation;95 and (3) establishing a one-year stat-
ute of limitations.96  The sunset provisions were to terminate 
on January 1, 1986.97 
In addition, the amendments created the California En-
tertainment Commission (“Entertainment Commission”)98 to 
study the entertainment industry and recommend a model 
regulatory bill to the legislature.99  After two years of delib-
eration,100 the Entertainment Commission recommended the 
                                                                                                                                  
stated by the legislature.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1436 (6th ed. 1990). 
94. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12; 
Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 514; Feller, supra note 92, at 
4.  This exception recognizes that “personal managers are prevalent in the re-
cording industry.”  Jelin, supra note 10, at 480. 
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (not-
ing that, under amendments to the TAA, negotiating a recording contract does 
not constitute performance of agency functions); Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; 
Gilenson, supra note 7, at 513; Feller, supra note 92, at 4. 
96. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 
(noting that amendments to the TAA established a one-year statue of limita-
tions); Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Feller, supra note 92, at 4. 
97. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494; Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Feller, supra note 
92, at 3.  The legislature did not allow these provisions to terminate.  O’Brien, 
supra note 2, at 495. 
98. The Entertainment Commission was composed of 10 individuals:  artists 
Ed Asner, John Forsythe, and Cicely Tyson; talent agents Jeffrey Berg, Roger 
Davis, and Richard Rosenberg; personal managers Bob Finklestein, Patricia 
McQueeney, and Larry Thompson; and the State Labor Commissioner C. Robert 
Simpson, Jr.  Id. at 495 n.148 (citing REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENTERTAINMENT 
COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 2 (1985) [hereinafter ENTER-
TAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT] (submitted pursuant to Act of Aug. 31, 1982, ch. 
682, § 6, 1982 Cal. Stat. 2814, 2816, repealed by Act of July 17, 1984, ch. 553, 1984 
Cal. Stat. 2185 (effective Jan. 1, 1986)); see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 489; 
Jelin, supra note 10, at 481-82; Feller, supra note 92, at 3. 
99. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494-95; Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Greenberg, 
supra note 2, at 488; Locker, supra note 83, at 29; Feller, supra note 92, at 3; Pan-
toga, supra note 50, at 328. 
100. The Entertainment Commission examined these issues:  
(1) Can unlicensed persons engage in procurement activities for artists?  
[No.] 
(2) Should any changes be made to the Act’s exception for persons pro-
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elimination of the sunset provisions and the permanent 
adoption of all three amendments.101  The Entertainment 
Commission interpreted the TAA as prohibiting personal 
managers from seeking or procuring employment for artists 
without a talent-agent license.102  Furthermore, the Enter-
tainment Commission determined that the TAA applies to 
any person who engages in procurement activity for an art-
ist.103  According to the Entertainment Commission’s Report, 
anyone who solicits or procures employment for an artist is 
subject to dispute resolution by the Labor Commissioner.104  
In 1986, the legislature adopted the Entertainment Commis-
sion’s recommendations.105  No major changes to the TAA 
                                                                                                                                  
curing recording contracts for artists?  [No.] 
(3) Should the Act contain criminal sanctions?  [No.] 
(4) Should the Act’s sunset provisions be removed?  [Yes.] 
(5) Should the Act be repealed and/or should there be a separate act for 
personal managers?  [No.] 
(6) Should any other changes be made to the Act?  [The Commission 
recommended several “administrative” changes.] 
O’Brien, supra note 2 at 495 n.149 (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 98, at 5); Jelin, supra note 10, at 482-83. 
101. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495; Jelin, supra note 10, at 483. 
102. ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 6; Cole-Wallen, 
supra note 47, at 488; Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328. 
103. The Entertainment Commission stated:  
[T]hat the prohibitions of the Act over the activities of anyone procuring 
employment for an artist without being licensed as a talent agent must 
remain, as they are intended to be, total . . . .  [O]ne either is, or is not, 
licensed as a talent agent, and, if not so licensed, one cannot expect to 
engage, with impunity, in any activity relating to the services which a 
talent agent is licensed to render. 
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495 (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 98, at 20); see also Feller, supra note 92, at 3 (stating that the Entertainment 
Commission declared that unlicensed individuals cannot procure employment); 
Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328 (reporting that the Entertainment Commission 
concluded that an agency license is required to perform any procurement activ-
ity). 
104. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495-96.  The Labor Commissioner’s determina-
tions espouse similar views.  Id. 
105. Id. at 495; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (acknowledging that, 
in 1986, the California legislature amended the TAA to provide:  (1) the re-
cording contract exception; (2) the exception for working in concert with licensed 
talent agents; and (3) the one-year statute of limitations); Feller, supra note 92, at 
3 (noting that in 1986, the legislature adopted all of the Entertainment Commis-
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have been adopted since then.106 
Two commentators, Neville Johnson and Daniel Lang, 
argue that, because personal managers do not primarily pro-
cure employment, the TAA was not intended to regulate 
such individuals.107  They rely on statutory definitions and 
syntactical uses to infer the legislative intent of the TAA.108  
They contend that the California legislature intended to 
“regulate only those whose primary purpose and function is 
the procuring of employment for artists.”109  The Labor 
Commissioner, however, has interpreted the TAA to include 
any attempt to procure employment.110 
b. Regulatory Scheme 
The TAA defines the role of talent agents in the enter-
tainment industry,111 and provides for the comprehensive 
regulation of talent agents who procure employment for art-
ists.112  Specifically, section 1700.4(a) of the TAA defines a 
                                                                                                                                  
sion’s recommendations). 
106. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495. 
107. Neville L. Johnson & Daniel W. Lang, The Personal Manager in the Cali-
fornia Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 388 (1979). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495-96. 
111. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 13.  The TAA 
defines the necessary terms.  See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.0-.4.  Article 1 of the 
TAA defines the following terms:  person, engagements, fee, license, licensee, 
talent agency, and artist.  Id. 
112. According to one commentator:  
Sections 1700 to 1700.4 are the definitional provisions.  Section 1700.5 
compels all individuals or organizations who engage in procurement 
activities to obtain a license from the Labor Commissioner.  Sections 
1700.6 through 1700.22 set forth particular licensing procedures, from 
the completion of an application to a surety bond requirement.  Sections 
1700.23 to 1700.41 govern the business affairs of talent agents, mandat-
ing Labor Commission approval of form agreements between agents 
and artists and prohibiting certain types of conduct.  Section 1700.44(a) 
gives the Labor Commissioner original Jurisdiction over disputes aris-
ing under the Act; he or she may hear all such controversies subject to a 
one-year statute of limitations and the right to appeal de novo to the 
superior court. 
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that 
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talent agent as a person engaged in the occupation of procur-
ing employment for artists.113  Furthermore, Article 2 of the 
TAA describes the licensing procedures,114 and expressly re-
                                                                                                                                  
California’s legislative regulatory scheme governing talent agents is extremely 
detailed); Feller, supra note 92, at 28 (suggesting that California is the state with 
the most developed system of regulating employment procurement in the enter-
tainment industry). 
113. Section 1700.4(a) of the TAA provides:  
Talent agency means a person or corporation who engages in the occu-
pation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure em-
ployment or engagements for an artist or artists, except that the activi-
ties of procuring, offering, or promising to procure recording contracts 
for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or corporation to 
regulation and licensing under this chapter.  Talent agencies may, in 
addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their profes-
sional careers. 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a). 
114. Id. §§ 1700.6-.22.  Anyone seeking a new license or the renewal of an 
existing license must file a written application, and license renewal is required 
every year.  Id. §§ 1700.6, 1700.10.  While processing an application, the Labor 
Commissioner has discretion to issue a temporary license valid for up to ninety 
days.  Locker, supra note 83, at 11.  The Labor Commissioner has the power to 
revoke a temporary license.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.14. 
Under Labor Code section 1700.8, the Labor Commissioner must give notice 
of the grounds for denying an application and must provide an opportunity for a 
hearing.  Id. § 1700.8.  The Labor Commissioner initiates the denial proceedings 
by serving the applicant with a statement of issues, providing the factual and le-
gal basis for the denial.  Locker, supra note 83, at 11.  Applicants request a hear-
ing to contest a denial by filing a notice of defense within fifteen days after re-
ceiving the statement of issues.  Id.  Although the Labor Commissioner presents 
its case first, the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that he meets the qualifications for receiving a license.  Id.  
An administrative law judge conducts the hearing and issues a proposed deci-
sion.  CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 11517, 11518.  The Labor Commissioner has discretion to 
accept or reject the proposed decision.  Id. § 11517.  By filing a timely petition for 
writ of administrative mandate, the applicant can obtain judicial review of the 
Labor Commissioner’s final decision.  Locker, supra note 83, at 12. 
Under section 1700.21 of the TAA, the Labor Commissioner has the authority 
to revoke or suspend a talent agency license on any of the following grounds:  (1) 
violation or failure to comply with the TAA; (2) lacking good moral character; (3) 
change of circumstances since the license was issued; or (4) a material misrepre-
sentation or false statement in the application.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.21.  Under 
section 1700.22 of the TAA, the provisions of the Administrative Hearings Act 
apply to suspension and revocation proceedings.  Id. § 1700.22.  In contrast to 
denial proceedings, in revocation or suspension proceedings, the Labor Commis-
sioner has the burden of proof.  Locker, supra note 83, at 12.  There are no other 
procedural differences between suspension and denial proceedings.  Id.  After 
having its license revoked, a talent agency is prohibited from applying for an-
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quires representatives who procure employment for artists 
to obtain an agent’s license,115 for which they must file a 
written application.116  After receiving an application, the 
Labor Commissioner investigates the applicant’s character 
and the nature of the talent agency.117  Article 2 also grants 
the Labor Commissioner has discretion to deny any applica-
tion.118 
Article 3 regulates talent agents’ business activities,119 re-
quiring all talent agents to:  (1) obtain the Labor Commis-
sioner’s approval of all form contracts; (2) maintain a sepa-
rate trust fund account for funds belonging to clients; (3) 
retain records for the client; (4) refrain from making mislead-
ing statements concerning an artist’s employment; and (5) 
avoid certain payment practices.120  Under section 1700.23, 
all talent agents must obtain Labor Commissioner approval 
of form contracts.121  The Labor Commissioner will withhold 
approval of any contract form that is unfair, unjust, or op-
                                                                                                                                  
other license for three years after the final decision upholding the revocation.  
CAL. LAB. CODE § 11506. 
115. Id. § 1700.5.  Labor Code section 1700.5 provides:  “No person shall en-
gage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a 
license therefor from the Labor Commissioner.”  Id. 
116. Id. § 1700.6. 
117. Id. § 1700.7. 
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.8. 
119. Id. §§ 1700.23-.41.  Labor Code section 1700.23 requires every talent 
agency to obtain the Labor Commissioner’s approval for form contracts utilized 
by the agency.  Id. § 1700.23.  Generally, the Labor Commissioner will disap-
prove any provision that creates a conflict of interest between the talent agency 
and the artist, or that diminishes the protection afforded by the TAA.  Locker, 
supra note 83, at 12.  The Labor Commissioner must approve the proposed con-
tract form before the issuance of a talent agency license.  Id.  Labor Code section 
1700.24 requires all agents to file a fee schedule with the Labor Commissioner.  
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.24.  Furthermore, the fee schedule must be filed before an 
agency license is issued.  Locker, supra note 83, at 12.  The Labor Commissioner 
does not allow any registration fee, defined at Labor Code section 1700.2(b) as 
any charge for registering or listing an artist for employment in the entertain-
ment industry, letter writing, photographs, film strips, video tapes, or other re-
productions of the artist.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.2(b). 
120. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 442 n.9 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23-.41). 
121. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23. 
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pressive to the artist.122  Under section 1700.26, talent agents 
must maintain records of:  (1) the names and addresses of all 
of their clients; (2) the amount of fees received from each cli-
ent; (3) the engagements secured on behalf of each client; 
and (4) the amount of compensation received by each cli-
ent.123 
Finally, the TAA grants the Labor Commissioner the au-
thority to resolve disputes arising under the TAA.124  The 
Labor Commissioner has original and exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear and determine all controversies regarding potential 
violations of the TAA.125  Because the Commissioner’s au-
thority extends to unlicensed individuals,126 personal man-
agers cannot escape the Labor Commission’s jurisdiction by 
failing to obtain a license or through any other action.127 
 
122. Locker, supra note 83, at 12. 
123. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.26.  Under Labor Code section 1700.27, every tal-
ent agency must allow the Labor Commissioner to inspect the records and to 
give the Labor Commissioner copies of these records if requested.  Id. § 1700.27. 
124. Id. § 1700.44(a).  Under Labor Code section 1700.44, the Labor Commis-
sioner has exclusive jurisdiction to determine controversies that arise under the 
TAA.  Id.  The Labor Commissioner’s jurisdiction is limited by Labor Code sec-
tion 1700.45, which allows the parties to refer contractual disputes to an arbitra-
tor in limited circumstances.  Id. § 1700.45. 
125. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44; see, e.g., Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 364, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that in cases arising under the TAA, 
the Labor Commissioner has original jurisdiction to the exclusion of the superior 
court); Martin D. Singer, Regulation of Talent Agents:  The Richard Pryor Determina-
tion, in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 255, 255 (Mi-
chael Meyer & John D. Viera eds., 1983); Feller, supra note 92, at 27 (citing CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1700.44). 
126. Section 1700.44(a) applies to all disputes between artists and individu-
als allegedly performing talent-agency services, regardless of whether the 
charged party has a license.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487 (citing Singer, supra 
note 125, at 255 (explaining that the Labor Commissioner has jurisdiction over 
individuals who perform talent agency services whether or not they are li-
censed).  Cases have established that individuals operating in violation of the 
TAA are exposed to statutory penalties regardless of whether they are licensed 
or not, Abdo, supra note 35, at 4 (citing Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)), because the TAA regulates both licensed and unli-
censed agents.  BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4; Feller, supra note 92, at 27 (citing 
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364). 
127. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4 (stat-
ing that the TAA applies to any person engaged in seeking employment for an 
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The TAA contains two exceptions to the licensing re-
quirement.128  First, individuals who procure recording con-
tracts for artists need not obtain talent agency licenses.129  
This exception recognizes that personal managers, rather 
than talent agents, customarily negotiate recording contracts 
for their artist-clients.130  Second, the TAA provides an ex-
ception for negotiating an employment contract when acting 
in concert with, and at the request of, a licensed talent 
agency.131  This exception only applies when licensed talent 
agents cooperate with unlicensed representatives to negoti-
ate employment contracts.132  It “creates the closest thing to a 
safe harbor” for managers engaged in employment negotia-
tions.133  Although some agents cooperate by giving personal 
managers letters confirming that the manager is authorized 
to work on specific deals for mutual clients, most agencies 
have a policy against issuing such letters.134 
c. Remedies for Violations of the TAA 
In addition to original and exclusive jurisdiction, the La-
                                                                                                                                  
artist). 
128. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4(a), 1700.44(d); BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 13; 
Gilenson, supra note 7, at 513; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4; Feller, supra note 92, at 4. 
129. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12; 
Siegel II, supra note 7, at 143; Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 
513; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4; Feller, supra note 92, at 4. 
130. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 500; see, e.g., Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stating 
that personal managers dominate the recording industry); Gilenson, supra note 7, 
at 513; Feller, supra note 92, at 4. 
131. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d). 
132. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 481 (stat-
ing that this exception creates an uneasy alliance between agents and managers). 
133. Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; see also Gilenson, supra note 7, at 514 (ac-
knowledging that this exception recognizes that personal managers often work 
with talent agents to determine the best opportunities for their clients); Feller, 
supra note 92, at 4 (stating that personal managers are safe when representing a 
performer who can also afford the services of a licensed talent agent who is will-
ing to cooperate with the manager). 
134. Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; see also O’Brien, supra note 2, at 500; Feller, 
supra note 92, at 4 (suggesting that personal managers seeking to come within 
this exception should obtain documentation of the talent agent’s request for the 
manager to work in conjunction on the particular project). 
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bor Commissioner has the authority to enforce the TAA and 
to fashion remedies for violations.135  Upon determining that 
an unlicensed individual has conducted talent agent ser-
vices, the Labor Commissioner will invalidate any contract 
between the unlicensed individual and the artist.136  The La-
bor Commissioner may also decide that the talent agent has 
surrendered his or her right to further fees or commis-
sions,137 that the artist is no longer liable for loans received 
from the agent to promote the artist’s career,138 and that the 
artist is entitled to receive funds already paid to the unli-
censed representative.139  On rare occasions, the Commis-
sioner may find that the agent has a right to some or all 
compensation based on quantum meruit.140  If the Commis-
sioner voids the management agreement, the void agree-
ment will serve to invalidate any collateral agreements or 
contracts entered into by the parties.141  The Labor Commis-
sioner thus has the power to divest unlicensed individuals of 
both past and future compensation.142 
The Labor Commissioner’s power to remedy violations 
of the TAA provides artists with significant protection from 
 
135. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491. 
136. If the Labor Commissioner determines that an unlicensed individual 
acted as a talent agent, any agreement between the artists and the unlicensed tal-
ent agent will be declared void.  ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
98, at 17-18; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; Jelin, supra note 10, at 477. 
137. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503. 
138. Id. 
139. Id.; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491 (citing Singer, supra note 125, at 258); 
see also Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7 (stating that managers may be 
forced to return commissions previously received from the client). 
140. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491 (citing Singer, supra note 125, at 258); see 
also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 505 (claiming that an unlicensed talent agent, 
who violated the TAA but did not engage in bad faith dealings, should receive 
an offset against the TAA’s damages for the value of the services rendered).  
“Quantum meruit” means “as much as deserved.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, su-
pra note 93, at 1243.  It is an equitable doctrine that implies a promise to pay a 
reasonable amount for benefits received when unjust enrichment would other-
wise occur.  Id. 
141. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491. 
142. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491. 
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individuals who unlawfully function as talent agents.143  
Most artists do not employ the TAA for protection; rather, 
they utilize the TAA to reclaim fees paid to personal repre-
sentatives.144  The remedies afforded by the TAA, however, 
are not self-enforcing.145  To initiate an action with the Labor 
Commission, an artist must file a complaint146—a procedure 
which commentators have strongly criticized.147  Notwith-
standing this criticism, the TAA has become both a powerful 
tool for artists seeking to void agreements, and a source of 
financial and professional misfortune for unlicensed indi-
viduals.148 
d. Ambiguous Language in the TAA 
In California, an individual who procures employment 
for an artist is deemed to be a talent agent.149  Under the 
TAA, only talent agents are permitted to procure employ-
 
143. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 507; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492; see also 
Locker, supra note 83, at 30 (stating that the TAA provides artists and the Labor 
Commissioner with a powerful tool for remedying abuses that remain in the en-
tertainment industry). 
144. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492.  Some artists try to use the TAA to avoid 
paying their manager past fees; other artists use the TAA to avoid paying their 
manager a share of future income.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 507 (suggesting 
that the most significant result of invalidating all management agreements for a 
violation of the TAA is that it eliminates the manager’s claim to any share of the 
artist’s future success). 
145. Id. at 496; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492; Locker, supra note 83, at 14. 
146. Unless a complaint is filed, the Labor Commission rarely initiates ac-
tion to enforce the TAA.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 496; Cole-Wallen, supra note 
47, at 516; Locker, supra note 83, at 14.  There are two types of complaints:  (1) 
artists’ alleging unlicensed procurement activities, and (2) talent agents’ seeking 
to recover fees.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 496; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492. 
147. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492. 
148. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 507 (stating that an unlicensed 
talent agent may expect severe punishment for even inconsequential involve-
ment in procurement activities when brought before the Labor Commissioner); 
Locker, supra note 83, at 30. 
149. An individual who performs procurement activities is legally defined 
as a talent agent.  ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 20; see, 
e.g., Greenberg, supra note 2, at 488 (noting that California law defines a talent 
agent as a person who procures employment for an artist); Jelin, supra note 10, at 
476; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510. 
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ment for artists.150  Therefore, participation in procurement 
activities will subject an individual to the TAA’s restric-
tions.151  Consequently, to establish a violation of the TAA, 
an individual must have engaged in unlicensed procurement 
activities on behalf of an artist.152 
Some commentators have argued that the TAA contains 
a significant ambiguity because the legislature neglected to 
define the term “procurement.”153  These commentators in-
sist that, because the term procurement is unclear, reason-
able people are uncertain whether particular actions violate 
the TAA.154  Consequently, commentators contend that unli-
censed personal managers are unfairly exposed to potential 
liability.155 
To determine the meaning of procurement, one must 
look primarily to the Labor Commissioner determinations156 
 
150. Under the TAA, a talent agency is defined as a person or corporation 
who procures employment for an artist.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); Jelin, supra 
note 10, at 476; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 488; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510. 
151. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 502; Jelin, 
supra note 10, at 476; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 511. 
152. Jelin, supra note 10, at 476; Greenberg, supra note 7, at 501; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 497; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 512; Locker, supra note 83, at 14. 
153. Jelin, supra note 10, at 477; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510; O’Brien, supra 
note 2, at 497. 
154. Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Feller, supra 
note 92, at 4. 
155. The failure to define the term procurement unfairly subjects unlicensed 
individuals to the TAA’s potentially harsh remedies.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 
507; see, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Feller, supra note 92, at 4. 
156. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497.  The Labor Commissioner hears TAA con-
troversies in offices throughout California.  Id.  All determinations are returned 
to the central office in San Francisco, and are available upon request.  Id.  How-
ever, the records are not well organized, and there is a considerable period of 
time between the institution of a controversy and its resolution.  Id. at 497 n.164 
(citing Karen A. Julian, Personal Manager or Talent Agent?  A Summary of Recent 
California Commission Findings in Regulation of Entertainers’ Representatives, in 1983 
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 315.  Be-
tween 1985 and early 1990, 165 TAA controversies appear to have been initiated.  
Id. (citing Julian, supra, at 315).  This represents over a 500% increase from the 
period of December 1977 to September 1983.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497 n.164 
(citing Julian, supra, at 315).  For unreported decisions of the California Labor 
Commissioner, see Richard Feller, Artist v. Manager v. Agent v. Labor Commis-
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and the California Entertainment Commission’s Report.157  
Unfortunately, however, the Labor Commissioner does not 
report its decisions.158  Consequently, members of the Cali-
fornia entertainment industry often have difficulty under-
standing the meaning of the term procurement.  Although 
the Commission has identified some specific activities as 
constituting procurement,159 hearing officers160 have failed to 
provide the public with a consistent definition.161 
Both the Labor Commissioner and the courts have 
broadly interpreted the term “procurement” to include any 
attempt to solicit employment for an artist.162  This definition 
has been interpreted to include introducing artists to pro-
ducers or directors,163 initiating contacts with employers,164 
furthering an offer for a artist-client,165 or negotiating em-
ployment contracts.166  Despite this attempted clarification, 
                                                                                                                                  
sioner—Developments in the Regulation of Entertainers’ Representatives, Syllabus for 
the Symposium of the Beverly Hills Bar Association, Nov. 12, 1983; Richard 
Feller, Artist v. Manager Revisited—Further Developments in the Regulation of Enter-
tainers’ Representatives, Syllabus for the Symposium of the Beverly Hills Bar As-
sociation, June 1, 1985. 
157. ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 6-12. 
158. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 477 (stating 
that Labor Commissioner decisions have no precedential value because they are 
unreported). 
159. For a list of activities that the Labor Commissioner has recognized as 
constituting “procurement,” see infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
160. Hearing officers are usually attorneys from the Division of Labor Stan-
dards Enforcement.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497 n.164.  Hearing officers, other-
wise known as administrative law judges, are assigned by the State Office of 
Administrative Hearings.  Locker, supra note 83, at 11-12. 
161. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497-98; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 477 (not-
ing that cases have not established a consistent definition of procurement). 
162. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 498; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 501 
(suggesting that the Labor Commissioner has taken a literal approach to the 
TAA’s definition of a talent agent); Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510-11 (stating that 
personal managers are infringing on the agent’s role by promising or attempting 
to procure employment). 
163. See, e.g., Derek v. Callan, No. TAC 18-80 (Cal. Labor Comm’r 1982). 
164. See, e.g., Pryor v. Franklin, No. TAC 17 MP 114 (Cal. Labor Comm’r 
1982). 
165. See, e.g., Kearney v. Singer, No. MP 429, AM 211 MC (Cal. Labor 
Comm’r 1978). 
166. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Wolf, No. TAC 29-79 (Cal. Labor Comm’r 1981). 
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commentators argue that the term is still vague,167 and urge 
the legislature to take appropriate steps to remove the ambi-
guity of the determinative language in the TAA.168 
Larry Thompson, a personal manager and member of the 
California Entertainment Commission,169 has advocated a 
three-tiered approach to defining procurement.170  Under 
Thompson’s approach, managers would be allowed to en-
gage in casual conversation, solicit employment when work-
ing in concert with agents, participate in contract negotia-
tions at an agent’s request.171  Thompson contends that his 
approach to defining procurement is consistent with the en-
 
167. Both the courts and the Labor Commissioner have attempted to give 
warning to personal managers by giving substance to the term procurement, 
however, they have been unable to cultivate a workable criteria for determining 
whether an individual has engaged in unlicensed procurement.  Furthermore, 
the existing judicial and administrative interpretations fail to clarify the concept, 
and many individuals still guess at its meaning.  Jelin, supra note 10, at 477; 
Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 499; Feller, supra note 92, 
at 4. 
168. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 499; see also Feller, supra note 92, at 4 (stating 
that the legislature should remove the ambiguity from the TAA). 
169. See discussion supra part I.B.2.a (discussing California’s Entertainment 
Commission). 
170. Larry Thompson has advocated the following approach to defining 
procurement:  
[T]he law is supposed to ‘shield’ artists from abuse, not provide a 
‘sword’ for voiding contracts.  Thus, Mr. Thompson suggests a three-
tiered approach to the definition of procurement:  (1) casual conversa-
tion, which a manager should be able to do; (2) solicitation [of] em-
ployment, which a manager should be able to do only in conjunction 
with an agent; and (3) negotiation of contracts which should be done 
only by an agent, unless the agent requests the manager’s participation.  
Thompson remarked that under the present law, ‘You could go to a 
dinner party, be sitting next to a producer, suggest your client for a role 
and that would be procuring.’ 
Jelin, supra note 10, at 482.  Larry Thompson’s views are not indicative of those of 
the California Entertainment Commission; rather, they reflect his interest as a 
personal manager.  Id.  Richard Rosenberg, talent agent and member of the 
Commission, feels differently about personal managers procuring employment:  
“They are not the victims.  They chose to go unregulated . . . [i]f they want to 
reap the benefits of unlimited commissions . . . then they should run the risk of 
their contracts being invalid if they violate the law.”  Id. 
171. Id. 
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tertainment industry reality that personal managers must 
engage in procurement activities.172 
2. Guilds and Unions 
In addition to state licensing requirements, various enter-
tainment unions regulate173 talent agents.174  To protect their 
members from unethical personal representatives,175 unions 
limit the types of agreements into which their artist-
members can enter.176  Three of the major talent unions177 are 
the American Federation of Musicians (“AFM”),178 the 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists 
(“AFTRA”),179 and the Screen Actors Guild (“SAG”).180  Un-
ion regulation of personal representatives is more extensive 
than California’s statutory regulation.181  The entertainment 
guilds and unions monitor the relationship between their 
 
172. Id. 
173. Unions regulate talent agents by limiting fees, requiring the use of form 
contracts, restricting the term of agreements, and requiring that the agent enter 
into a franchise agreement with the union.  BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25; 
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, 
at 487. 
174. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25 (noting that entertainment labor un-
ions regulate agents who deal with their members); Abdo, supra note 35, at 4 
(explaining that entertainment unions impose additional restrictions on agents to 
protect their members). 
175. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25 
(noting that entertainment labor unions regulate agents because of concerns 
about the “vulnerability of their members due to high unemployment rates”); 
Abdo, supra note 35, at 4 (reporting that unions impose restrictions on personal 
representatives to protect their members). 
176. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25; 
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479. 
177. The Directors Guild of America and the Writers Guild of America are 
also significant entertainment guilds.  O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487. 
178. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487. 
179. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487. 
180. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487. 
181. Union regulation is more detailed and rigorous than state regulation.  
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; Cole-Wallen, supra 
note 47, at 512. 
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artist-members and the personal representatives who pro-
cure employment for them.182  Unions place many regula-
tions on their members, such as limiting the percentage that 
agents may charge, requiring the use of form contracts, and 
directing agents to obtain franchise licenses.183 
The entertainment guilds and unions also impose restric-
tive conditions on a personal representative’s compensa-
tion.184  AFTRA and SAG prohibit talent agents from receiv-
ing commissions that exceed ten percent of the artist’s gross 
earnings.185  Nonetheless, AFTRA and SAG do not authorize 
their members to pay commissions for the services of a per-
sonal manager.186  In addition, they prohibit the payment of 
commissions over ten percent to any franchisee.187  The AFM 
allows agents to receive commissions of twenty percent for 
booking one-night engagements and fifteen percent for 
 
182. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487; Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 519; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4. 
183. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 485; BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25; Green-
berg, supra note 2, at 492-95.  Franchise agreements limit commissions, the dura-
tion of agency-agreements, and prohibit certain types of business activities that 
talent agents may concurrently engage in.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; see also 
Soocher, supra note 42, at 5 (stating that the franchise agreement between the tal-
ent agent and the American Federation of Musicians determines the terms of any 
agreement between the agent and an artist who is a member of the federation). 
184. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 1; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; 
Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 520-21 (explaining that there is no California law 
limiting talent-agency fees, but that the various entertainment unions impose fee 
limits on talent agents). 
185. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (citing American Federation of Televi-
sion and Radio Artists Regulations Governing Agents, Rule 12-B, § XX, at 21-22 
(1971) [hereinafter AFTRA Rule 12-B]; Screen Actors Guild Agency Regulations, 
Amended Rule 16(g), § XI, at 18-23 (1968) [hereinafter Rule 16(g)]); see also Jelin, 
supra note 10, at 479 (stating that both AFTRA and SAG limit an agent’s commis-
sion to 10% of the artist’s gross compensation). 
186. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (citing AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 184, 
§ XX, at 21-22; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, at § XI, at 18-23); see also Jelin, supra 
note 10, at 479-80 (stating that both AFTRA and SAG prohibit “double compen-
sation,” meaning that when a talent agent and a personal manager represent the 
same artist, they have to split the ten percent fee). 
187. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (citing AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 184, 
§ XX, at 21-22; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, at § XI, at 18-23). 
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longer engagements.188  Moreover, the AFM permits fran-
chised talent agents to sign a personal management agree-
ment that allows agents to act both as personal managers 
and booking agents, and entitles them to receive an addi-
tional five percent commission.189  Because personal manag-
ers usually receive fees in excess of those authorized by the 
unions, union regulation prevents personal managers from 
receiving their customary fees.190 
The unions also regulate the duration of the artist-
representative relationship.191  SAG and AFTRA impose 
term limits of three years in most circumstances.192  In other 
circumstances, SAG by-laws limit the agreement to an initial 
one-year term.193  The AFM allows five-year terms in some 
instances, and up to seven-year terms in others.194  In con-
trast, the TAA does not limit the duration of the relation-
 
188. Id. (citing Constitution By-Laws and Policy of the American Federation 
of Musicians of the U.S. and Canada, art. XXIII, § 8, at 130 (rev. ed. 1981) [herein-
after AFM By-Laws]).  The AFM has a more liberal rule because the union recog-
nizes that personal managers provide important services to their members.  Jelin, 
supra note 10, at 480. 
189. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492-93 (citing AFM By-Laws, supra note 188, 
art. XXIII, § 8, at 130).  The AFM recognizes the purpose served by personal 
managers in the music industry by authorizing an additional five percent com-
mission for talent agents providing personal manager services.  Jelin, supra note 
10, at 480.  Aside from this AFM provision, no guild or union recognizes per-
sonal managers.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494. 
190. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing the fees that personal man-
agers usually receive). 
191. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 493; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 479 (not-
ing that unions limit the duration of representative’s contracts). 
192. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494 (citing AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 184, 
§ XIII-B(1), at 15; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, § XI-K(2), at 22); Jelin, supra note 10, 
at 480.  SAG and AFTRA also provide that artists may terminate their agree-
ments with representatives if the representative does not obtain work for the cli-
ent within a specified period of time.  Id.  Subjecting personal managers to this 
provision would encourage them to procure employment.  Id. 
193. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494 (citing Rule 16(g), supra note 184, § XI-
K(1), at 22); see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stating that in some instances, 
SAG only allows a one-year agreement). 
194. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494 (citing AFM By-Laws, supra note 188, 
art. XXIII, § 9, at 131-33). 
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ship.195  However, California Labor Code section 2855 limits 
the term of contracts for personal services to seven years.196  
Personal managers prefer longer terms, so as to maximize 
the potential return on investment.197 
Additionally, the unions do not allow talent agents to 
procure employment for any union member without a fran-
chise license from that union.198  Franchise agreements limit 
the commissions that talent agents can charge,199 restrict the 
length of exclusive representation agreements,200 and pro-
hibit agents from engaging in certain activities.201  The enter-
tainment unions prohibit franchised representatives from 
obtaining equity interests in an artist’s total earnings or 
products.202  This restriction prevents representatives from 
contracting for an equity interest in any artist who is a mem-
ber of a union.203 
The entertainment guilds and unions also prohibit fran-
 
195. Id. at 493. 
196. Under section 2855 of the California Labor Code, contracts to render 
personal services are not enforceable beyond seven years.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 
2855. 
197. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stat-
ing that personal managers prefer agreements that last for five years, because of 
the time necessary to recoup their investment). 
198. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481 (citing Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 519); 
see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (noting that agents representing union art-
ists must be “franchised”). 
199. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487 (noting that unions regulate talent agents by limiting fees). 
200. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487. 
201. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487. 
202. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 493 (citing AFM By-Laws, supra note 188, 
art. XXIII, § 11, at 133; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, § XVI-B, at 28); see also Jelin, su-
pra note 10, at 480 (stating that unions prohibit agents from obtaining equity in-
terests in their clients). 
203. According to one commentator, “[a] logical alternative for the man-
ager” who endures great risk is to “contract for an equity interest in the total 
earnings of the artist in addition to the commission [the manager] is paid for his 
services.”  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 493.  This type of agreement embodies the 
business principle that the rate of return on an investment should reflect the level 
of risk.  Id. 
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chised talent agents from engaging in certain activities,204 
particularly from conducting specified forms of business.205  
For example, guilds and unions do not allow franchised tal-
ent agents to create their own productions.206  Despite this 
prohibition, talent agents are free to “package”207 union-
members into projects.208 
Moreover, any union member who engages the services 
of a talent agent without a franchise license will be subject to 
union discipline.209  Consequently, the union may seek to 
impose sanctions on both the artist and the artist’s represen-
tative for violating union rules.210  However, the guilds and 
unions lack absolute control over the industry, and therefore 
cannot always enforce their by-laws and regulations against 
all individuals.211   
3. California Case Law Interpreting the TAA 
For many years, personal managers who performed tra-
ditional managerial functions, such as advising, counseling, 
directing, and developing an artist’s career, were not within 
the scope of the TAA.212  As a result, personal managers who 
only incidentally procured employment for artists did not 
 
204. Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; O’Brien, su-
pra note 2, at 487. 
205. Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492. 
206. Jelin, supra note 10, at 480. 
207. “Packaging” occurs when a talent agent groups together all of the art-
ists for a particular project.  Id.  The talent agent will chose the screenwriter, the 
director, the actors, and the musicians; and will bring the completed “package” 
to a production company.  Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494.  Union discipline can include a fine, 
suspension, or expulsion from the union.  Id.  Suspension or expulsion can be an 
exceptionally harsh punishment to an artist who depends on receiving union 
work.  Id. 
210. Id.  The union can proceed against a personal manager who is not li-
censed as a talent agent.  Id.  Despite the ability to proceed against personal 
managers, unions rarely enforce their regulations against personal managers.  
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494. 
211. Id. at 495. 
212. Steinberg & Hazzard, supra note 7, at B7. 
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think that they were required to obtain a license from the 
Labor Commissioner.213  The following cases have estab-
lished the foundation for subsequent conflicting interpreta-
tions of the TAA.214 
In Raden v. Laurie,215 Ted Raden, a personal manager, 
sued artist Piper Laurie for commissions due under a written 
contract.216  The contract stated that the manager was not au-
thorized to procure employment for the artist.217  Laurie 
sought to void the contract on the ground that, in disregard 
of the contract, Raden had agreed to procure employment.218  
Despite Raden’s denial of having ever agreeing to seek en-
gagements for the artist,219 the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the artist.220  On appeal, Raden argued 
that summary judgment should not have been granted.221  
The Labor Commissioner filed an amicus brief contending 
that the contract was a subterfuge designed to conceal 
Raden’s procurement function.222  The Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment 
because there was conflicting evidence concerning the terms 
of the parties’ agreement.223 
 
213. Id. 
214. See discussion infra part II.A (discussing two conflicting interpretations 
of the TAA). 
215. 262 P.2d 61 (1953). 
216. Id. at 63. 
217. Id.  The contract included the following clause:  “nothing herein con-
tained shall be deemed to require [the manager] or authorize [the manager] to 
seek or obtain employment for the [artist].”  Id. 
218. Id. at 63-64.  The artist alleged that the unlicensed personal manager 
had agreed to attempt to procure employment, and had unsuccessfully tried to 
do so on several occasions.  Raden, 262 P.2d at 63-64. 
219. Id. at 64 (“It was denied in the affidavit that [the manager] stated to [the 
artist] that he could or would obtain employment.”). 
220. Id. at 63.  According to the artist, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in her favor on the grounds that the manager was not licensed.  Id. at 
64. 
221. Raden, 262 P.2d at 65. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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In Buchwald v. Superior Court,224 the Court of Appeals pre-
sided over a dispute between the musical group Jefferson 
Airplane and personal manager Matthew Katz.225  The writ-
ten agreement between the parties stated that the manager 
had agreed not to obtain employment for the group, and that 
he was not authorized to do so.226  Nevertheless, the group 
alleged that Katz had procured engagements for them.227  In 
an attempt to avoid the licensing requirement, Katz argued 
that the written agreement established that he was not sub-
ject to statutory regulation.228  The court rejected Katz’s con-
tention and declared that Katz could not use a written con-
tract to circumvent the TAA.229  Thus, Buchwald has been 
interpreted as standing for the proposition that the sub-
stance of an agreement is controlling.230 
In Barr v. Rothberg,231 the Labor Commissioner heard a 
dispute between actress Roseanne Barr and her personal 
manager Arlyne Rothberg.232  Barr argued that Rothberg had 
 
224. 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
225. Id. at 367-68. 
226. Id. at 367 (“The contract contained a provision reading:  ‘It is clearly 
understood that you [Katz] are not an employment agent or theatrical agent, that 
you have not offered or attempted or promised to obtain employment or en-
gagements for me, and you are not so obligated, authorized or expected to do 
so.’”). 
227. Id. at 368. 
228. Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370. 
229. Id. at 370.  The court reasoned that, according to Katz, “[t]he form of the 
transaction, rather than its substance would control.”  Id.  The court stated, “the 
Act may not be circumvented by allowing language of the written contract to 
control.”  Id.  Additionally, the court declared:  “The court, or as here, the Labor 
Commissioner, is free to search out illegality lying behind the form in which a 
transaction has been cast for the purpose of concealing such illegality.”  Id. (citing 
Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 308 P.2d 713). 
230. Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370; see also Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 
(stating that, “while Buchwald did not address the precise question of whether a 
license is necessary for incidental procurement activities, it did hold generally 
that procurement efforts require a license and that the substance of the parties’ 
relationship, not its form, is controlling”); BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (assert-
ing that the Buchwald decision demonstrates how the Labor Commission’s juris-
diction is implied from the performance of talent agency services). 
231. No. TAC 14-90 (1992). 
232. Id. 
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acted as an unlicensed agent by participating in the negotia-
tion of her employment agreements.233  The Labor Commis-
sioner found that Rothberg had worked with Barr’s agents 
and that Rothberg had limited her input to creative issues.234  
The Commission examined the totality of the manager’s ac-
tivity and adopted a center-of-gravity test.235  Under this test, 
a manager may incidentally participate in negotiations con-
ducted by a licensed talent agent if the manager’s primary 
concern is the client’s career direction.236  The Labor Com-
missioner concluded that Rothberg’s role in the negotiations 
was directed towards developing Barr’s career, rather than 
procuring the employment agreement.237  The Labor Com-
missioner’s decision allows managers who are concerned 
primarily with their artist-client’s career direction to partici-
pate in agent-conducted negotiations.238 
Thus, after Barr, commentators maintain that the Labor 
Commissioner is more tolerant of personal manager in-
volvement in employment negotiations.239  Nevertheless, 
personal managers are not permitted to procure employ-
ment for artists. 
D. Entertainment Industry Regulation in New York 
Like California, New York has a significant entertain-
ment industry.240  In order to regulate the industry, New 
York has adopted a detailed regulatory scheme.241  This sec-
tion examines how New York regulates the entertainment 
industry and how the New York courts administer this regu-
latory system. 
 
233. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 488. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 488-89. 
236. Id. at 488. 
237. Id. (citing Barr v. Rothberg, No. TAC 14-90 (1992)). 
238. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 488. 
239. Id. 
240. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 472. 
241. BIEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 4. 
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1. Statutory Regulation 
Section 172 of New York’s General Business Law242 pro-
hibits the operation of an employment agency without a li-
cense;243 unlicensed procurement activities constitute a mis-
demeanor.244  New York’s employment agency statute245 
contains an exception to the licensing requirement for per-
sons engaged in “the business of managing such entertain-
ments . . . [and] artists . . . where such business only inciden-
tally involves the seeking of employment . . . .”246  The 
 
242. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 172 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997). 
243. Id.; see also Paul Karl Lukacs, How New York and Tennessee Regulate Tal-
ent Agencies, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 15, 15 (1996) (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 172 
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996)) (stating that “every person who operates an 
‘employment agency’ for a fee must be licensed”). 
244. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 190; see also Lukacs, supra note 242, at 16 (noting 
that violating the licensing requirement is a misdemeanor).  In New York, both 
the commissioner and artists have the power to initiate criminal proceedings. 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 190, 193 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).  In California, 
unlicensed procurement is specifically excluded from the criminal statutes.  CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b).  Nevertheless, the civil penalties in California can be 
harsh.  See discussion supra part I.C.2.c (discussing penalties imposed for viola-
tion of TAA). 
245. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171.  New York regulates talent agencies as part 
of the state’s overall regulation of employment agencies.  Lukacs, supra note 242, 
at 15 (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 170-194 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996)).  An 
“employment agency” includes a “theatrical employment agency,” defined as a 
person who “procures or attempts to procure” engagements for “circus, vaude-
ville, the variety field, the legitimate theater, motion pictures, radio, television, 
phonograph recordings, transcriptions, opera, concert, ballet, modeling or other 
entertainments or exhibitions or performances . . . .”  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 
171(2)(d), 171(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996)). 
246. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8); see, e.g., Lukacs, supra note 242, at 15 (cit-
ing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8)); Soocher, supra note 42, at 5.  New York’s case 
law does not really flesh out the meaning of the exception.  Lukacs, supra note 
242, at 15.  Typically, the court will state that the relationship does or does not 
satisfy the requirements of the exception.  Id. (citing Angileri v. Vivanco, 137 
N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (“It is hard to believe that the claim [of ex-
emption] is serious”); Nazarro v. Washington, 81 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1948) (“Clearly, the terms of this contract bring it within the exception . . . .”); 
Gervis v. Knapp, 182 Misc. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (“The contract estab-
lishes that plaintiff was primarily a manager . . . .”)).  Whether the incidental 
booking exception applies to an individual is a question of fact to be decided 
“[u]pon proof of all the facts and circumstances, including the conduct of the 
parties . . . .”  Hyde v. Vinolas, 254 N.Y.S. 687, 689 (App. Div. 1932); see also 
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incidental booking exception applies only to representatives 
who function primarily as personal managers for their artist-
clients.247 
Unlike California law, New York law does not recognize 
an exception to the licensing requirement for individuals 
who work with licensed theatrical agents.248  Rather, New 
York law discourages personal managers from working with 
agents,249 by subjecting them to the potential loss of the pro-
tection of the incidental booking exception if they perform 
their services in concert with talent agents.250 
New York’s statutory scheme also lays out the formal 
steps necessary to obtain a theatrical employment agency li-
cense.251  All licensed agencies must pay a licensing fee to, 
and deposit a bond with, either the state or city commis-
                                                                                                                                  
Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680, 682 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (stating 
that determining whether the exception applies is a question of fact); Lukacs, su-
pra note 242, at 15 (noting that whether a contract is incidentally one for agency 
services is a question of fact).  For an example of a case in which disputed actions 
were held to fall within the exception, see Heyman v. Howell, 133 N.Y.S.2d 19 
(Spec. Sess. 1954). 
247. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8); Jelin, supra note 10, at 478; Soocher, supra 
note 42, at 5; Lukacs, supra note 242, at 15 (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8)).  
The exception is not available to all individuals who engage in incidental pro-
curement.  Jelin, supra note 10, at 478.  For New York cases that have upheld the 
exception in favor of personal managers, see Pine v. Laine, 36 A.D.2d 924 (N.Y. 
App. Term 1971), aff’d, 321 N.Y.2d 988 (1973); Nazarro v. Washington, 81 N.Y.S.2d 
769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948) (finding that the terms of the contract brought it within 
the incidental booking exception); Gervis v. Knapp, 182 Misc. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1948); Pawlowski v. Woodruff, 122 Misc. 695 (N.Y. App. Term 1924), aff’d, 212 A.D. 
891 (N.Y. 1925).  For New York cases that have found that the procurement activ-
ity brought the relationship outside of the exception because it was more than 
“incidental,” see Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1977); Russell-Stewart, Inc. v. Birkett, 24 Misc. 2d 528 (N.Y. 1960); Angileri v. 
Vivanco, 137 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
248. See discussion supra part I.C.2.b (describing TAA exemption for work-
ing in concert with licensed talent agents). 
249. Jelin, supra note 10, at 478. 
250. In New York, working in concert with an agent has been used to prove 
that the personal manager was engaged in too much procurement of employ-
ment.  Id. 
251. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 172-176. 
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sioner.252  Claims and suits brought against a licensed 
agency are often satisfied with payment from the agency’s 
bond deposit.253 
In the interest of protecting individuals seeking employ-
ment, New York places additional prohibitions on the con-
duct of employment agencies.254  New York law limits the 
fees that may be charged by a licensed agency.255  The statute 
also includes sections on provision enforcement,256 and pen-
alties for violations.257 
2. New York Case Law 
As discussed above, New York’s statutory regulation of 
talent agents includes an incidental booking exception for 
personal managers.258  The New York courts have had little 
difficulty administering the exception.259 
In Mandel v. Liebman,260 New York’s Court of Appeals 
faced a dispute between personal manager Louis Mandel 
and artist Max Liebman.261  Mandel brought the action 
against Liebman to collect commissions allegedly due under 
 
252. Id. § 177.  The agency will pay either the industrial commissioner of the 
State of New York, or the commissioner of licenses of the City of New York.  Id. § 
171.1. 
253. Id. § 178. 
254. Id. § 187.  For example, employment agencies are prohibited from send-
ing clients to any place “maintained for immoral or illicit purposes.”  N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 187.6. 
255. Id. § 185.  Theatrical engagements are classified as Class C.  Id. § 185.4.  
As such, the maximum fee allowed is 10% of the artist’s gross compensation for 
a single engagement or 20% for engagements in the opera and concert fields.  Id. 
§ 185.8. 
256. Id. § 189. 
257. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 190.  Criminal proceedings are authorized for vio-
lations of the statute.  Id. 
258. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing incidental booking excep-
tion). 
259. See O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509 (noting that only a few New York cases 
have involved disputes over the incidental booking exception). 
260. 100 N.E.2d 149 (N.Y. 1951). 
261. Id. at 150. 
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a management contract.262  The Supreme Court interpreted 
the contract as one that is terminable at will, and dismissed 
the complaint.263  The Appellate Division affirmed the trial 
court’s decision on the grounds that the contract was void 
and against public policy because Mandel was not required 
to perform any services for Liebman.264  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals declared that New York’s incidental book-
ing exception prevented courts from finding a contract ille-
gal solely on the grounds that an unlicensed personal man-
ager procured employment for an artist.265  Furthermore, the 
court stated that the issue of whether an unlicensed personal 
manager violated New York’s licensing requirements was a 
question of fact for the jury.266  Thus, Mandel demonstrates 
how New York’s incidental booking exception was designed 
to work. 
In Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc.,267 the Civil Court of the 
City of New York addressed the following issue:  whether 
the licensing requirements applied to a booking agent who 
secured lectures and engagements for a motion picture and 
theatrical personality.268  William Friedkin brought suit to 
recover commissions paid to Harry Walker, the booking 
 
262. Id. at 151. 
263. Id. 
264. 101 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Term 1950).  Subsequently, the Appellate Divi-
sion denied reargument and granted a change in opinion.  102 N.Y.S.2d 563 
(App. Term 1951). 
265. 100 N.E.2d at 155.  The court stated that:  
[I]t cannot be said as matter of law that the contract was illegal and void 
for the reason that plaintiff, in violation of section 172 . . . was conduct-
ing a theatrical employment agency without a license therefor.  By ex-
press exemption in subdivision 4 of section 171 . . . a person engaged in 
the business of managing ‘entertainments, exhibitions or performances, 
or the artists or attractions constituting the same, where such business 
only incidentally involves the seeking of employment therefor’ is not 
required to be licensed. 
Id.; see discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing incidental booking exception). 
266. 100 N.E.2d at 155.  The court reversed the judgment and granted a new 
trial.  Id. 
267. 395 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Civ. Ct. 1977). 
268. 395 N.Y.S.2d at 611. 
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agent who secured engagements for him.269  The court held 
that agents must be licensed if they do not satisfy the re-
quirements of the incidental booking exception.270  The court 
declared that the incidental booking exception did not apply 
to Walker because he did not serve as Friedkin’s personal 
manager.271  Furthermore, the court ordered Walker to re-
turn his commissions to Friedkin.272  Thus, Friedkin demon-
strates the criteria that must be satisfied in order for the inci-
dental booking exception to apply to an individual.273 
II. THE CALIFORNIA TALENT AGENCIES ACT:  JUDICIAL 
 INTERPRETATION AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Part II presents the legal conflict in the California Court 
of Appeals over whether unlicensed personal managers are 
permitted to procure employment.  First, this part examines 
the interpretation of the TAA in Wachs v. Curry,274 a decision 
that allows personal managers to procure employment for 
artists if procurement is not a significant part of the man-
ager’s business.275  Second, this part discusses Waisbren v. 
 
269. Id. at 612. 
270. Id. at 611.  The court stated:  agents must be licensed “ . . . unless the 
agent is in the business of managing such a clientele and the seeking of employ-
ment is only incidentally involved.”  Id.  There are two requirements to satisfy 
the incidental booking exception:  (1) the representative must serve as personal 
manager to the client, and (2) the seeking of employment must be incidental to 
the managerial role.  See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing incidental book-
ing exception). 
271. Friedkin, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 613.  The court stated:  “[t]he instant contract 
cannot be characterized as one of management:  it is abundantly clear upon a 
reading that [Friedkin’s] obligation is to solicit lecturing engagements for 
[Walker] . . . [Friedkin] is clearly an unlicensed employment agency within N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW 171(2)(a) and the exclusionary provision of N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
171(8) is clearly inapplicable.”  Id. at 613-14 (citing Pine v. Laine, 36 A.D.2d 924 
(N.Y. App. Term 1971), aff’d, 293 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1973); Allen v. Brice, 165 Misc. 
181 (N.Y. 1937); Farnum v. O’Neill, 141 Misc. 555 (N.Y. 1931); Meyers v. Walton, 
76 Misc. 510 (N.Y. 1912). 
272. Friedkin, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
273. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing when incidental 
booking exception applies). 
274. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (Ct. App. 1993). 
275. Id. at 503. 
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Peppercorn Productions, Inc.,276 a Court of Appeals decision 
that conflicts with Wachs, by prohibiting personal managers 
from procuring employment without obtaining a talent 
agent’s license.277  Finally, this part reviews possible solu-
tions to the dilemma created by these two conflicting deci-
sions. 
A. Recent California Decisions 
Recently, two courts have reached opposing conclusions 
in interpreting the TAA.278  In Wachs, the Court of Appeals 
held that unlicensed personal managers can procure em-
ployment on an incidental basis.279  However, in Waisbren, 
the Court of Appeals held that only licensed talent agents 
may engage in procurement activities.280 
1. Wachs v. Curry 
In Wachs v. Curry, the California Court of Appeals, Sec-
ond Appellate District, elaborated on the center-of-gravity 
test enunciated in Barr.281  The Wachs court held that unli-
censed personal managers may procure employment for 
their clients if such activities do not constitute a “significant 
part” of the manager’s business.282  Wachs involved a dispute 
based on a written contract between the entertainer Arsenio 
Hall, and Wachs and X Management, Inc. for personal man-
agement services.283  Hall filed a petition with the Labor 
 
276. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995). 
277. Id. at 441. 
278. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 490. 
279. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503. 
280. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. 
281. See discussion supra part I.C.3 (describing the center-of-gravity test that 
was adopted by the court in Barr). 
282. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.  The Wachs court held that personal 
managers who incidentally procure employment for their clients are not subject 
to the TAA.  Id.; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7. 
283. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.  Plaintiffs contracted for 15% of Hall’s 
earnings from his entertainment industry activities.  Id.  The contract established 
that:  “You [Hall] have not retained our personal management firm under this 
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Commissioner when Wachs allegedly acted as an unlicensed 
talent agent by procuring and attempting to procure em-
ployment for the entertainer.284  Hall requested that the La-
bor Commissioner order Wachs to return all monies re-
ceived from either Hall or Hall’s employers in connection 
with Hall’s entertainment industry activities.285  Wachs filed 
an answer to Hall’s petition denying the allegations.286 
Before the Labor Commissioner could resolve the contro-
versy, Wachs and X Management sued the Labor Commis-
sioner in California state court,287 alleging that the TAA’s li-
censing provisions were unconstitutional.288  Wachs argued 
that the TAA was unconstitutional because no rational basis 
existed for exempting the procurement of recording con-
tracts from the licensing requirement.289  Furthermore, 
Wachs contended that the language of the TAA was uncon-
stitutionally vague.290  Wachs sought a judgment declaring 
the TAA unconstitutional, thereby enjoining the Labor 
Commissioner from enforcing the licensing requirement.291  
The trial court, however, granted the state’s motion for 
summary judgment and held that the licensing provisions 
were constitutional.292 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals faced two issues:  (1) 
whether a rational basis existed for exempting procurement 
                                                                                                                                  
agreement as an employment agent or a talent agent.  This firm has not offered 
or attempted or promised to obtain employment or engagement for you and this 
firm is not obligated, authorized or expected to do so.”  Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. 
287. Id. (“While Hall’s petition was pending before the labor commissioner,” 
Wachs and X Management initiated action against the Labor Commissioner “and 
other state officials charged with enforcing the Act.”). 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.  Wachs alleged that “it cannot be deter-
mined from the language of the Act which activities require licensing as a talent 
agent.”  Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
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of recording contracts from the licensing requirements of the 
TAA,293 and (2) whether the licensing provisions were un-
constitutionally vague.294  In deciding the first issue, the 
court applied the conventional “rational relationship” test, 
which requires a rational relationship between the statute’s 
purpose and the means by which it is accomplished.295  The 
court noted that the California legislature had created the 
California Entertainment Commission to study the TAA,296 
and that the Entertainment Commission recommended that 
the legislature exempt the procurement of recording con-
tracts from the licensing requirements of the TAA.297  The 
court accepted the Commission’s recommendation as consti-
tuting a rational basis for the provision.298  Additionally, the 
court observed that, even within the same business, statutes 
may classify individuals differently when such persons per-
form different work.299  The court concluded that a rational 
basis existed for exempting procurement of record contracts 
from the licensing requirements.300 
Second, the Wachs court addressed whether the licensing 
requirements of the TAA are void for vagueness.301  Wachs 
 
293. Id. at 501-02. 
294. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-04. 
295. Id. at 501 (citing D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal.3d 1, 
17 (1974)). 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 502.  The court noted that the California Entertainment Commis-
sion recommended the exemption because recording contracts and other per-
sonal-services contracts differ fundamentally.  Id.; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 
(citing Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 625-26).  Additionally, the court acknowledged 
the personal manager’s role in securing recording contracts for artists.  Steinberg, 
supra note 7, at B7 (citing Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 625-26). 
298. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502.  The court stated that the “report from 
the Legislature’s own commission of experts provide[d] a sufficiently rational 
basis for the exemption from the licensing requirement.”  Id. 
299. Id.  The court noted that “[n]umerous decisions” support classifying 
differently “persons in the same general type of business . . . where their meth-
ods of operation are not identical.”  Id. (citing Marsh & McLennan of Cal., Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. App. 3d 108, 121 (1976)). 
300. Id. at 501. 
301. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-04. 
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contended that the term “occupation of procuring [employ-
ment],” found in section 1700.4(a) of the TAA, did not suffi-
ciently define what type of conduct required a license.302  
The court noted that the issue raised due process concerns.303  
The court applied the Hall v. Bureau of Employment Agen-
cies304 test to determine whether the statute satisfied due 
process.305  This test inquires whether words used in a stat-
ute can be made “reasonably certain” by referring to “defin-
able sources.”306  The court reasoned that an individual 
could determine with “reasonable certainty”307 what types of 
conduct required a license by examining the dictionary defi-
nitions of “occupation” and “procurement,”308 and the legis-
lative purpose and history of the TAA.309  Consequently, the 
 
302. Id. at 502. 
303. Id. 
304. 64 Cal. App. 3d 482 (1976). 
305. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502 (citing Hall, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 494).  The 
court stated that:  
[I]f the words used may be made reasonably certain by reference to the 
common law, to the legislative history of the statute involved, or to the 
purpose of that statute, the legislation will be sustained. . . . Reasonable 
certainty is all that is required.  A statute will not be held void for un-
certainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its 
language. 
Id. (citing Hall, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 494). 
306. See supra note 305 (discussing the Hall test). 
307. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502. 
308. The court defined “occupation” as “the principal business of one’s life:  
a craft, trade, profession or other means of earning a living.”  Id. (citing 
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER’S]).  The court stated that the term “procure” meant “to get possession 
of:  obtain, acquire, to cause to happen or be done:  bring about.”  Id. at 503 (cit-
ing WEBSTER’S, supra, at 1809). 
309. The court compared the activities regulated by the Artists’ Managers 
Act of 1943 and the TAA.  Id.  The court stated that:  
Comparison of the activities regulated in the two acts shows a marked 
change of emphasis from the counseling function to the employment 
procurement function.  Under the Artists’ Managers Act the focus was 
on persons who engaged in ‘the occupation of advising, counseling or 
directing artists’ in the ‘development or advancement’ of their careers 
and who engaged in procuring employment ‘only in connection with 
and as a part of’ their duties as advisor and counselor.  Under the Act, 
the focus is on persons engaged ‘in the occupation of procur-
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court concluded that the statute satisfied due process con-
cerns.310 
Third, the court examined the TAA’s legislative history 
under the Hall test and found that its purpose was the pro-
tection of artists.311  Toward this end, the court applied the 
Barr test to the personal manager’s overall business to de-
termine whether an agency license was required.312  The Barr 
test determines if an individual is subject to the TAA’s li-
censing requirements by examining the totality of the man-
ager’s activities for the client at issue.313  In contrast, the 
Wachs test examines the totality of the manager’s activities 
for all clients.314  The Wachs test asks if the procurement ac-
tivities are a “significant portion” or an “incidental part” of 
an individual’s business.315  Under this test, individuals be-
                                                                                                                                  
ing . . . employment or engagements for an artist. . . .’  These persons 
‘may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their 
professional careers.’ 
Id. at 503. 
310. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 502; see discussion supra part I.C.3 (discussing Barr test). 
313. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503. 
314. Id.  The court stated that:  
We conclude from the Act’s obvious purpose to protect artists seeking 
employment and from its legislative history, the ‘occupation’ of procur-
ing employment was intended to be determined according to a stan-
dard that measures the significance of the agent’s employment function 
compared to the agent’s counseling function taken as a whole.  If the 
agent’s employment function constitutes a significant portion of the 
agent’s business as a whole then he or she is subject to the licensing re-
quirement of the Act, even if, with respect to a particular client, pro-
curement of employment was only an incidental part of the agent’s 
overall duties.  On the other hand, if counseling and directing the cli-
ents’ careers constitutes the significant part of the agent’s business then 
he or she is not subject to the licensing requirements of the Act, even if 
with respect to a particular client, counseling and directing the client’s 
career was only an incidental part of the agent’s overall duties.  What 
constitutes a ‘significant part’ of the agent’s business is an element of 
degree we need not decide in this case. 
Id. 
315. Id.  The California Labor Commissioner was the defendant in the Wachs 
case, and “according to oral statements later made by the Labor Commissioner’s 
lawyer, it was the Commissioner’s lawyer himself who had made the ‘significant 
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come subject to the licensing provisions when their pro-
curement function extends beyond an incidental part of their 
business.316  Thus, the court concluded that the licensing re-
quirements of the TAA were not void due to vagueness,317 
and affirmed the trial court’s decision.318 
After Wachs, the Labor Commissioner employed the 
“significant part” test when determining whether the TAA 
had been violated.319 
2. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc. 
In Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.,320 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals rejected the “significant part” test 
adopted in Wachs in favor of a rule that requires personal 
managers who incidentally procure employment for artists 
to obtain talent agency licenses.  From 1982 through 1988, 
Brad Waisbren served as the personal manager for Pepper-
corn Productions, Inc., a corporation that specializes in de-
signing puppets for use in the entertainment industry.321  In 
1990, Waisbren sued Peppercorn for commissions allegedly 
due under an oral management agreement.322  Waisbren 
admitted to having only occasionally engaged in unlicensed 
procurement activities for Peppercorn.323  Consequently, the 
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Pep-
                                                                                                                                  
part’ argument to the appellate court.”  Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7. 
316. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503. 
317. Id. at 502. 
318. Id. at 504. 
319. See, e.g., Church v. Brown, No. TAC 52-92 (1994); see also Licensing Per-
sonal Managers, supra note 7; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7. 
320. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 437 (Ct. App. 1995); Stan Soocher, Incidental Deter-
mination, 10 ENT. L. & FINANCE 8 (1996). 
321. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439; Soocher, supra note 320, at 8; Pantoga, 
supra note 50, at 327; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7. 
322. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7; Pantoga, 
supra note 50, at 327; Soocher, supra note 320, at 8. 
323. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 n.3; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7; Pan-
toga, supra note 50, at 327.  On some occasions, Waisbren procured employment 
on behalf of Peppercorn, “but his efforts in that regard were incidental to his 
other responsibilities.”  Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439. 
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percorn.324  The court found that the management contract 
was void because Waisbren had engaged in talent agency 
services by procuring employment for Peppercorn without 
having obtained a talent agency license.325 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that an 
individual must be licensed under the TAA even if the indi-
vidual occasionally procures employment for artists.326  In 
reaching its decision, the court examined:  (1) the plain 
meaning of the TAA;327 (2) the remedial purpose of the 
TAA;328 (3) the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the 
TAA;329 (4) recent legislative action;330 (5) the TAA’s limited 
exception for unlicensed persons;331 and (6) prior judicial 
construction of the TAA.332 
First, the Waisbren court analyzed the TAA’s plain mean-
ing to determine whether it applied to managers who only 
incidentally procure employment for artists.333  The court re-
jected Waisbren’s argument that he was not required to ob-
tain a license because his principal responsibilities did not 
involve procuring employment for Peppercorn.334  The court 
stated that Waisbren’s narrow definition335 unfairly limited 
 
324. Id. 
325. Id.; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7; Pantoga, supra note 50, at 327; So-
ocher, supra note 320, at 8. 
326. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.  The court had to “decide whether a 
person needs to be licensed under the Act if he occasionally procures employ-
ment for an artist” and “conclude[d] that a license is required.”  Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 441-42. 
329. Id. at 442. 
330. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442-45. 
331. Id. at 445. 
332. Id. at 445-46. 
333. Id. at 441. 
334. Id.  The court disagreed with Waisbren’s contention that “because ‘oc-
cupation’ is defined as ‘the principal business of one’s life,’” a license is only 
necessary when “a person’s principal responsibilities involve procuring em-
ployment for an artist.”  Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. 
335. See supra note 334 (describing the narrow definition of “occupation” 
that Brad Waisbren supported). 
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the term “occupation.”336  The court further reasoned that a 
person can engage in an “occupation” even if he does not 
spend most of his time in that business.337  The court con-
cluded that a person can be engaged in an “occupation” that 
is not his principal line of work.338 
Second, the Waisbren court reasoned that all persons who 
procure employment for artists must be licensed because of 
the purpose behind the TAA.339  The court declared that the 
TAA served a remedial purpose,340 and that the Wachs test 
defeated this purpose because it was “unworkable.”341  Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that limiting an unlicensed 
manager to engaging in only incidental procurement activi-
ties would not help the artist who falls “victim to a violation 
of the [TAA].”342  Therefore, the court concluded that both 
the “occasional” talent agent and the full-time agent are sub-
 
336. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.  The court observed that the narrow 
definition “ignores the possibility that a person can have more than one job.”  Id. 
337. Id.  The court stated that “‘occupation’ is synonymous with ‘employ-
ment,’ which includes ‘temporary or occasional work or service for pay.”  Id. (cit-
ing WEBSTER’S, supra note 306, at 743); see also Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328 (not-
ing that individuals can engage in part-time occupations, and can have 
occupations that are not their sole line of work); Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7. 
338. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.  Additionally, the court reasoned that 
“the Act is entirely consistent with the concept of dual occupations—for exam-
ple, being a personal manager and a talent agent.”  Id.  The court declared that 
their “interpretation of the statutory language d[id] not render the term ‘occupa-
tion’ mere surplusage.”  Id. at 441 n.6.  The court proposed that the legislature 
included the term “occupation” because they “intended to cover those who are 
compensated for their procurement efforts.”  Id. 
339. Id. at 441-42.  The legislature enacted the TAA to protect artists.  See 
discussion supra part I.C.1.a (explaining legislative intent of the TAA). 
340. Waisbren, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.  The court noted that “[t]he Act is a 
remedial statute.”  Id. (citing Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 
(Ct. App. 1967)).  The TAA was enacted for the benefit of artists seeking em-
ployment.  Id. (citing Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 367). 
341. Id. at 442.  The court stated that “[t]he statutory goal of protecting art-
ists would be defeated if the Act applied only” when a personal manager signifi-
cantly engages in procurement of “employment for artists.”  Id.; see also Stein-
berg, supra note 7, at B7 (stating that the Waisbren court noted that the significant 
part test was unworkable and would undermine the remedial purpose of the 
TAA). 
342. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
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ject to the TAA’s regulations.343 
Third, the Waisbren court examined the Labor Commis-
sioner’s interpretation of the TAA.344  The court noted that 
the Labor Commissioner had authority to enforce the 
TAA.345  The court stated that the Labor Commissioner had 
interpreted the TAA as requiring all individuals who pro-
cure employment for artists to obtain licenses.346  The court 
observed that an enforcing agency’s interpretation of a stat-
ute is entitled to great consideration.347  Furthermore, the 
court noted that courts should defer to an enforcing agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of a statute.348  Finally, the court 
concluded that the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of 
 
343. Id.  The court “refuse[d] to believe that the Legislature intended to ex-
empt a personal manager from the Act—thereby allowing violations to go unre-
medied—unless his procurement efforts cross some nebulous threshold from 
‘incidental’ to ‘principal.’”  Id.  The court expanded on its argument, stating:  
Perhaps a personal manager’s procurement activities should no longer 
be considered ‘incidental’ when they exceed 10 percent of his total 
business.  Or perhaps the line should be drawn at 25 or 50 percent.  We 
simply cannot make this determination because the Act provides no ra-
tional basis for doing so.  Moreover, even if we could somehow justify 
using a particular figure, it would be virtually impossible to determine 
accurately whether a personal manager had exceeded it. 
Id. at 442 n.10. 
344. Id. at 442. 
345. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a)). 
346. Id.  The Labor Commissioner “has long taken the position that a license 
is required for incidental procurement activities.”  Id.; see also Steinberg, supra 
note 7, at B7.  But see Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7 (noting that the 
“significant part” test was urged on the courts by the Labor Commissioner, and 
that the test has been used by the Labor Commissioner ever since).  In Derek v. 
Callan, No. TAC 18-80 (Jan. 14, 1982, Lab. Comr.), a personal manager argued 
that the TAA allowed incidental procurement of employment.  Id. at 6.  The La-
bor Commissioner responded, “[t]hat is like saying you can sell one house with-
out a real estate license or one bottle of liquor without an offsale license.”  Id.; 
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
347. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.  The court stated that “[t]he construc-
tion of a statute by an agency charged with its administration is entitled to great 
weight.”  Id. (citing Henning v. Industrial Welfare Com., 46 Cal.3d 1262, 1269 
(1988)). 
348. Id.  “If the administrative agency’s construction is reasonable,” the 
Waisbren court declared that other courts “should defer to it.”  Id. (citing Henning, 
46 Cal.3d at 1269). 
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the TAA—that a license is required to engage in any pro-
curement activities on behalf of an artist—was reasonable, 
and thus, upheld it.349 
Fourth, the Waisbren court considered the California leg-
islature’s position as requiring a license for the incidental 
procurement of employment.350  Additionally, the court ana-
lyzed the California Entertainment Commission’s report re-
garding the TAA.351  The court observed that the Commis-
sion had determined that a license was necessary to perform 
any procurement activity.352  Furthermore, the court noted 
that the California Legislature had adopted all of the Com-
mission’s recommendations.353  Consequently, the court 
concluded that the legislature had approved the Commis-
sion’s view that only licensed talent agents can procure em-
ployment for artists.354 
Fifth, the Waisbren court declared that the TAA’s limited 
exception to the licensing requirement—namely, working in 
concert with a licensed talent agent355—required all indi-
 
349. Id.  Because the court found “the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation 
of the Act” to be reasonable, the court “agree[d] with his analysis of the licensing 
requirement.”  Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
350. Id.  The court declared that “the Legislature has adopted the view that a 
license is required for incidental procurement activities.”  Id. 
351. Id. at 443; see discussion supra part I.C.2.a (describing California’s En-
tertainment Commission’s report). 
352. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443 (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 98, at 6).  The Report’s first issue was:  “Under what condi-
tions or circumstances, if any, should personal managers or anyone other than a 
licensed talent agent be allowed to procure employment for an artist without be-
ing licensed as a talent agent?”  Id. (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 98, at 6).  The Report indicated that “[n]o person, including personal 
managers, should be allowed to procure employment for an artist in any manner 
without being licensed as a talent agent.”  Id. (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 98, at 1). 
353. Id. at 444. 
354. Id. (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 11).  
The court observed that “[t]his legislative approval extends to the Commission’s 
finding that the Act imposes a total prohibition on the procurement efforts of 
unlicensed persons.”  Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444-45 (citing ENTERTAINMENT 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 11). 
355. Pursuant to section 1700.44(d), unlicensed representatives may act “in 
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viduals who procure employment for artists to obtain 
agency licenses.356  Under this exception, a personal manager 
who cooperates with a licensed talent agent can seek em-
ployment for an artist.357  The court stated that reading the 
TAA to allow unlicensed individuals to engage in incidental 
procurement activities would render this exception “super-
fluous.”358  Accordingly, the court concluded that the TAA 
does not allow for unlicensed procurement by managers be-
cause it contains the exception regarding managers’ working 
with licensed agents.359 
Finally, the Waisbren court analyzed prior judicial con-
struction of the TAA.360  The Waisbren court noted that, in 
Buchwald, the court interpreted the TAA to require a license 
for all procurement activities.361  Additionally, the Waisbren 
court examined Wachs,362 and acknowledged the Wachs 
                                                                                                                                  
conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency in the negotia-
tion of an employment contract” for an artist.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d); see 
discussion supra part I.C.2.b (discussing exception for working in concert with 
licensed talent agents). 
356. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445. 
357. Id. (citing O’Brien, supra note 2, at 500). 
358. Id.  The Waisbren court reasoned that “this exception to the licensing 
scheme would be unnecessary if incidental or occasional procurement efforts did 
not require a license in the first place.”  Id.; see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 
(stating that the Waisbren court reasoned that the exception for working with li-
censed agents would be unnecessary if incidental procurement did not require a 
license). 
359. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445. 
360. Id. at 445-46. 
361. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 (citing 62 Cal. Rptr. at 364); see also dis-
cussion supra part I.C.3 (describing the Buchwald decision).  Although Buchwald 
did not address specifically “whether a license is necessary for incidental pro-
curement activities, it did hold generally that procurement efforts require a li-
cense and that the substance of the parties’ relationship, not its form, is control-
ling.”  Id. 
362. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445-46; see discussion supra part II.A.1 (dis-
cussing the Wachs decision).  The Waisbren court noted:  
[T]hat Wachs applied an overly narrow concept of “occupation” and did 
not consider the remedial purpose of the Act, the decisions of the Labor 
Commissioner, or the Legislature’s adoption of the view (as expressed 
in the California Entertainment Commission’s Report) that a license is 
necessary for incidental procurement activities. 
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446. 
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court’s holding that the licensing requirement does not ap-
ply unless an individual’s procurement activities constituted 
a “significant part” of his business.363  The Waisbren court de-
termined that, because Wachs declined to define “significant 
part,”364 the import of its holding was unclear.365  Addition-
ally, the court noted that Wachs addressed a limited issue:  
whether the TAA’s use of the term “procure” was unconsti-
tutionally vague.366  The Waisbren court held that the TAA 
did not support the Wachs holding, and was therefore 
wrongly decided.367  Consequently, the court rejected Wais-
bren’s argument that the TAA did not require him to have 
an agent’s license because his procurement activities were 
only occasional.368 
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ruled that the man-
agement contract was void due to Waisbren’s unlicensed 
procurement efforts.369  To this end, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor 
of Peppercorn.370 
Although Waisbren is the latest statement of the law, it 
does not clarify the confusion in California’s entertainment 
 
363. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446 (citing Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503). 
364. Id. (citing Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503). 
365. Id. 
366. Id. 
367. Id.  The court stated that:  
Given Wachs’ recognition of the limited nature of the issue before it, we 
regard as dicta the court’s interpretation of the term “occupation” and 
its statement that the Act does not apply unless a person’s procurement 
function is significant.  Because the Wachs dicta is contrary to the Act’s 
language and purpose, we decline to follow it. . . .  Thus, we conclude 
that the Wachs dicta is incorrect to the extent it indicates that a license is 
required only where a person’s procurement efforts are “significant.” 
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446; see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 (noting that 
the Waisbren court rejected the “significant part” test as incorrect dicta). 
368. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.  The court disagreed with Waisbren’s 
argument that the Wachs holding compelled “the conclusion that a personal 
manager need not be licensed if he procures employment for an artist on an oc-
casional basis.”  Id. 
369. Id. at 437. 
370. Id. 
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industry.371  The Waisbren decision directly contradicts the 
critical portion of the Wachs holding.372  Commentators con-
tend that more litigation is sure to follow due to these two 
conflicting California Court of Appeal decisions.373 
B. Possible Solutions 
Personal managers perform an essential role in the enter-
tainment industry.374  In their normal course of business, 
however, they risk incurring legal sanctions.375  Commenta-
tors have suggested ways for the legislature to remove these 
risks and thereby encourage individuals to perform personal 
management services.376  This section examines two poten-
tial solutions for resolving the conflict of whether personal 
managers may ever procure employment for clients.  The 
first proposal suggests that the legislature amend the TAA to 
include an incidental booking exception.  The second rec-
ommendation recommends that the legislature enact a stat-
ute which explicitly regulates personal managers. 
1. The Incidental Booking Exception 
Commentators argue that the California Legislature 
should amend the TAA to include an incidental booking ex-
ception.377  They contend that this proposal would be benefi-
cial in two respects:  (1) it would encourage individuals to 
become personal managers, and (2) it would provide bene-
fits to an artist employing the services of a personal man-
 
371. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 490. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 508; see discussion supra part I.A.2 (describ-
ing personal manager’s role in the entertainment industry). 
375. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 508; see discussion supra part I.C.2.c (dis-
cussing legal sanctions that may be imposed on individuals who violate the 
TAA). 
376. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 508.  A solution must encourage persons to 
become personal managers and protect their interests.  Id. 
377. Id. at 509-10; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 508-09. 
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ager.378  Drafted carefully, they assert that an incidental 
booking exception would be advantageous to both personal 
managers and artists.379 
Commentators suggest enacting an incidental booking 
exception because it acknowledges an entertainment indus-
try reality—that “any personal manager worth his or her 
commission”380 procures at least some employment for a cli-
ent.381  Critics also argue that the exception would remove 
some of the risks that personal managers face while conduct-
ing their day-to-day services382—namely, that an artist will 
attempt to void an otherwise legitimate contract for man-
agement services,383 and subject the personal manager to 
harsh penalties from the Labor Commissioner for engaging 
in any unlicensed procurement activity.384  Accordingly, 
many commentators contend that an incidental booking ex-
ception would encourage individuals to become personal 
managers. 
Commentators also assert that artists would benefit from 
an incidental booking exception.385  They argue that artists 
would receive better representation under the exception,386 
because an artist who is unhappy with the engagements 
supplied by their licensed talent agent could secure em-
ployment elsewhere.387  Consequently, commentators argue 
that artists would receive better representation and more 
 
378. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 509-10. 
379. Id. at 509-10. 
380. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (explaining that personal 
managers must procure employment). 
381. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the 
personal manager in the entertainment industry). 
382. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 509-10. 
383. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (explaining that artist 
may seek to void management contracts in order to avoid paying for manage-
ment services). 
384. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 509-10; see discussion supra part I.C.2.c (de-
scribing penalties that the Labor Commissioner has authority to administer). 
385. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. 
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choice of engagements if the legislature enacted the excep-
tion.388 
In order to clearly define who can engage in unlicensed 
procurement, commentators Johnson and Lang have sug-
gested exempting personal managers who do not regularly 
perform procurement activities.389  A second approach is to 
exempt personal managers who have made reasonable, but 
unsuccessful, attempts at securing a licensed talent agent for 
their clients.390 
Critics of the incidental booking exception counter that 
such a law would be ambiguous because there is no worka-
ble test.391  Nonetheless, proponents maintain that New York 
has successfully employed its incidental booking exception 
in a sensible manner,392 and that the California Legislature 
should use New York’s exception as a model for drafting a 
similar provision.393  Accordingly, they propose to amend 
section 1700.4(a) of the TAA to state the following:  
Talent agency means a person or corporation who en-
gages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or 
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an 
artist or artists, except (1) that the activities of procuring, of-
fering, or promising to procure recording contracts for an 
artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or corpora-
tion to regulation and licensing under this chapter; and (2) 
that a person or corporation shall not be subject to regulation and 
licensing under this chapter (a) when the person or corporation is 
acting as personal manager for an artist or artists, and (b) the per-
son’s or corporation’s services only incidentally involves procur-
 
388. Id. 
389. Id.  The New York courts have employed this method in administering 
their incidental booking exception.  See, e.g., Friedkin v. Harry Walker Inc., 90 
Misc. 2d 680 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977). 
390. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510. 
391. Id. (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 49-50 (statement of Harry Sloan, 
National Executive Secretary to the Screen Actors Guild)). 
392. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509. 
393. Id. 
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ing, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or 
engagements for an artist or artists.394 
Drafted in this manner, the TAA would include an inci-
dental booking exception that closely parallels New York’s 
exception.395 
Understandably, talent agents oppose the exception, 
claiming that it would harm their business.396  They contend 
that personal managers would have an advantage over tal-
ent agents because managers would be allowed to perform 
agent functions without being subjected to the TAA’s regu-
lations.397  However, proponents of the exception note that 
personal managers would find it very difficult to perform 
the functions of both manager and talent agent on a full-time 
basis, particularly because a great amount of time is required 
to perform either task by itself.398  Furthermore, proponents 
of the exception maintain that, if the artist achieves even 
some degree of success, this time-management issue would 
soar, prompting most managers to secure a talent agent for 
the client.399  Additionally, proponents argue that, because of 
the influence talent agents have in the entertainment indus-
try, enacting the exception would not significantly interfere 
with their business.400 
 
394. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (language in italics denotes proposed 
change). 
395. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental book-
ing exception). 
396. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510. 
397. Id. at 510-11 (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 49 (statement of Harry 
Sloan)). 
398. Id. at 511 (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 230 (statement of R.L. Mel-
cher, President, Association for Talent Representatives)). 
399. Id. (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 188 (statement of Joe Gottfried, 
Conference of Personal Managers)). 
400. Id.  Commentators contend that it is unlikely that an incidental booking 
exception would significantly reduce the amount of business available to talent 
agents.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 511.  They reason that talent agents control 
the most important engagements and have exclusive agreements with most em-
ployers.  Id. 
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2. A Personal Managers Act 
Commentator Gary Greenberg contends that amending 
the TAA to include an incidental booking exception would 
not solve the problem.401  Greenberg argues that the Califor-
nia legislature should provide personal managers with a 
separate and specific statement concerning their activities.402  
Accordingly, he suggests that California legislators enact a 
PMA to expressly regulate personal managers.403 
Greenberg contends that the PMA would serve two basic 
functions:  (1) providing personal managers and artists with 
access to inexpensive dispute resolution; and (2) defining the 
fiduciary obligations that personal managers owe to their 
clients.404  Additionally, Greenberg maintains that the PMA 
should define the personal manager’s activities.405  Further-
more, he asserts that the PMA should include an incidental 
booking exception, thereby allowing personal managers to 
engage in incidental procurement activities.406  Finally, 
Greenberg argues that the PMA should avoid imposing re-
strictive requirements on the activities of personal manag-
ers.407 
First, Greenberg observed that the TAA provides talent 
agents and artists with an inexpensive form of dispute reso-
lution.408  Greenberg contends that the PMA should contain 
provisions for inexpensive dispute resolution, thereby bene-
fiting both personal managers and artists.409 
 
401. Id. at 512. 
402. Id. 
403. Id. 
404. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 514. 
405. Id. at 512. 
406. Id. at 514. 
407. Id. at 513-14. 
408. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (granting Labor Commissioner exclusive 
jurisdiction in resolving disputes arising under the TAA). 
409. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 512.  Commentators assert that a similar 
provision in the PMA would provide the same economic advantage to personal 
managers and artists.  Id.  Proponents of the PMA maintain that the new statute 
must specify the method of selecting hearing officers.  Id. at 512 n.134.  They al-
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Second, Greenberg suggests that a PMA would provide 
personal managers with a definitive statement regarding 
their required conduct.410  As noted above, personal manag-
ers and artists carry on highly personal relationships;411 also, 
in many cases, an artist is vulnerable to the manager who is 
controlling the artist’s career.412  As a result, Greenberg con-
tends that the legislature should clearly establish the fiduci-
ary obligations that personal managers owe to their cli-
ents.413 
Third, Greenberg argues that the legislature should not 
include restrictive requirements in the PMA.414  He contends 
that the prohibitions and requirements of the new regulatory 
statute should be designed to encourage personal manage-
ment relationships.415  Greenberg reasons that restrictions 
should not deter people from becoming personal managers, 
nor should they heavily regulate personal managers’ com-
pensation.416  Specifically, he maintains that the PMA should 
be less restrictive than the TAA in the following ways:  (1) 
                                                                                                                                  
lude to the inequities in the enforcement of the TAA as an indication that not all 
of the Labor Commissioner’s administrative law judges are familiar with the re-
alities in the entertainment industry.  Id.  They would avoid this situation by 
having groups representing artists and personal managers establish a list of hear-
ing officers.  Id.  Alternatively, they would draft a selection process for agreeing 
upon a hearing officer.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 512 n.134. 
410. Id. at 512. 
411. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (explaining that personal 
managers and artists engage in personal relationships). 
412. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 512. 
413. Id.  In a fiduciary relationship, one party depends upon another to sat-
isfy certain needs, such as in an agency relationship.  See generally Tamar Frankel, 
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).  At common law, misrepresentation 
and misappropriation are actionable fiduciary violations.  Greenberg, supra note 
2, at 512 n.135.  Commentators assert that the remedies available at common law 
would be expanded by including a statutory requirement of utmost good faith in 
the PMA.  Id. at 512. 
414. Id. at 513. 
415. Id.  According to the United States Senate Advisory Committee on In-
dustrial Relations, regulations should develop the roles of creative entrepreneurs 
and small businesses.  Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
SENATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 13 (1979)). 
416. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 513.  Proponents contend that the PMA 
should impose as few restrictions as possible.  Id. 
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eliminate the requirement for a bond;417 (2) disregard the re-
quirement that managers maintain a place of business sepa-
rate from their residence;418 (3) minimize administrative fees 
and charges;419 (4) minimize penalties for statute violations 
(other than breach of fiduciary duty);420 and (5) avoid exces-
sive penalties by delineating the damages available for spe-
cific violations.421  Greenberg contends that drafting the 
PMA in this manner would ensure that the cost of comply-
ing with the statute would not deter many people from be-
coming personal managers.422 
Greenberg concedes that, because of the various func-
tions performed by personal managers, it would be difficult 
to determine an appropriate fee limit.423  If fees are limited, 
however, he asserts that the limits should conform to indus-
try standards—at least twenty percent for musicians and fif-
teen percent for other artists.424  Additionally, Greenberg ar-
gues that the PMA should not limit the duration of 
management agreements; nonetheless, if it does, any limita-
tion should allow terms of at least five years for musicians 
and three years for other artists.425 
To protect artists, Greenberg contends that the PMA 
should authorize the Labor Commissioner to terminate an 
agreement when the personal manager is not applying his 





420. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 513. 
421. Id. 
422. Id.  Commentators do not want compliance costs to deter people from 
becoming personal managers.  Id. 
423. Id. 
424. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 513.  Proponents of the PMA use these fig-
ures because they were adopted as maximums by the Conference of Personal 
Managers.  Id. at 513 n.137 
425. Id. at 513.  Commentators argue that because personal managers are not 
rewarded for their efforts until their clients achieve success, limiting their ability 
to contract for a long term will deprive them of reasonable compensation.  Id. 
426. Id. at 513-14.  Under this provision, the personal manager should be 
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advantage to personal managers, Greenberg maintains that 
managers should be allowed to obtain equity interests in cli-
ents.427 
Greenberg also argues that the PMA should not require 
personal managers to be licensed.  First, he contends that li-
censing unnecessarily drives up compliance costs.428  Sec-
ond, a PMA that establishes the conduct required by both 
parties would render licensing unnecessary.429 
Greenberg asserts that personal managers should be al-
lowed to engage in procurement activities without obtaining 
a talent agent’s license.430  He argues that the incidental 
booking exception is the best solution,431 and that personal 
managers should not be allowed to engage in unlimited pro-
curement activities that would frustrate the purpose of the 
TAA.432  Greenberg reasons that, if it is not possible to enact 
a workable incidental booking exception, the current law 
must be maintained.433 
III. ENACTING THE PERSONAL MANAGERS ACT WOULD REMOVE 
 THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE WAISBREN DECISION 
The Waisbren court’s decision to prohibit all unlicensed 
procurement activities reflects the court’s misunderstanding 
of entertainment industry realities,434 where personal man-
                                                                                                                                  
given the benefit of a presumption that he was acting reasonably.  Greenberg, 
supra note 2, at 514. 
427. Id.  Allowing equity interests will encourage managers to invest in cli-
ents.  Id.  Commentators contend that because the PMA includes a statement of 
required fiduciary behavior, financial involvement will not create conflicts of in-
terest.  Id. 
428. Id. 
429. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 514. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. 
432. Id.  Proponents of the PMA do not advocate allowing personal manag-
ers to procure employment on an unlimited basis because that would neutralize 
the TAA by punishing compliance.  Id. 
433. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 514. 
434. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (describing the Waisbren decision). 
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agers often must procure employment for artists.435  The 
Waisbren decision, however, prohibits personal managers 
from engaging in procurement activities without obtaining a 
license.436  By enacting the PMA, the legislature would re-
move personal managers from the dilemma that they en-
counter under the Waisbren decision.437  The PMA protects 
the interests of both personal managers and artists.438  More-
over, the PMA is compatible with the TAA and would there-
fore provide artists with greater protection.439  As detailed 
below, this Comment argues that the California Legislature 
should enact the PMA to govern personal managers.440 
A. The Waisbren Court Interpreted the TAA Incorrectly 
This Comment maintains that the Waisbren court’s inter-
pretation of the TAA was flawed.  The court should have in-
terpreted the TAA as permitting unlicensed procurement of 
employment on an incidental basis. 
In Waisbren,441 the Court of Appeals held that any indi-
vidual who procures employment for an artist must obtain a 
talent agent’s license.442  The court arrived at this interpreta-
tion of the TAA by examining:  (1) the plain meaning of the 
TAA;443 (2) the remedial purpose of the TAA;444 (3) the Labor 
 
435. See O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84 (stating that personal managers pro-
cure employment for artists); Abdo, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that managers 
procure employment); see also discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing why most 
personal managers procure employment for artists). 
436. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437. 
437. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing the dilemma that personal 
managers face because they are not allowed to procure employment). 
438. See discussion infra part III.B (explaining how the PMA protects the in-
terests of both personal managers and artists). 
439. See supra notes 83-88 (describing the purpose behind the TAA). 
440. See supra notes 404-07 (describing how the PMA governs personal man-
agers). 
441. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; see discussion supra part II.A.2 (dis-
cussing the Waisbren decision). 
442. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437. 
443. Id. at 441. 
444. Id. at 441-42. 
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Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA;445 (4) recent leg-
islative action;446 (5) the TAA’s exception for working in 
concert with licensed talent agents;447 and (6) prior judicial 
construction of the TAA.448 Yet, the court’s analysis was 
flawed in its reasoning and examination of:  (1) the TAA’s 
plain meaning;449 (2) the TAA’s remedial purpose;450 (3) the 
Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA;451 and (4) 
the TAA’s exception for cooperating with licensed agents.452 
First, the court inaccurately characterized the term “oc-
cupation” when it examined the TAA’s plain meaning.453  
The TAA defines a “talent agency” as “a person or corpora-
tion who engages in the occupation of procur-
ing . . . employment or engagements for an artist or art-
ists.”454  The legislature included the term “occupation” 
specifically to regulate talent agents—individuals whose 
principal line of work is the procurement of employment.455  
The Waisbren court, however, determined that an individual 
could be engaged in an “occupation” even if it was not his 
principal line of work.456  This definition contravened the 
 
445. Id. at 442. 
446. Id. at 442-45. 
447. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445. 
448. Id. at 445-46. 
449. See supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren 
court’s analysis of the TAA’s plain meaning). 
450. See supra notes 339-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren 
court’s analysis of the TAA’s remedial purpose). 
451. See supra notes 344-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren 
court’s analysis of the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA). 
452. See supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren 
court’s analysis of the TAA’s exception for working in concert with licensed tal-
ent agents). 
453. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (defining “occupation” broadly). 
454. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (emphasis added) (defining “talent 
agency”). 
455. See Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503 (stating that an individual is engaged 
in the occupation of procuring employment if their procurement efforts consti-
tute a significant part of their business); see also discussion supra part II.A.1 (dis-
cussing Wachs decision). 
456. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (defining “occupation” broadly). 
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legislature’s intentions. 
In similar fashion, the Waisbren court reasoned that the 
legislature had included the term “occupation” in the TAA 
to regulate individuals who receive compensation for their 
procurement activities.457  Under this broad definition, the 
TAA would define a “talent agency” as any person or corpo-
ration who is compensated for procuring employment or en-
gagements for an artist or artists.458  But under this broad 
definition of occupation, the term occupation is unnecessary 
in defining talent agency459 because the TAA’s definition of 
talent agency would be the same even if the word occupa-
tion was omitted.  Therefore, if defined broadly, the term oc-
cupation is rendered superfluous in the TAA’s definition of 
talent agency.460 
Second, when the court examined the remedial purpose 
behind the TAA, it erroneously assumed that unlicensed in-
cidental procurement of employment harms artists.461  The 
court properly recognized that the legislature enacted the 
TAA to protect artists;462 however, the court also assumed 
that personal managers abstain from obtaining a talent 
agency license in order to take advantage of artists.463  The 
court concluded that allowing unlicensed personal managers 
to procure employment on an incidental basis would harm 
artists and frustrate the TAA’s purpose.464  In doing so, the 
court failed to acknowledge the indispensable role that per-
sonal managers play in the career development of artists.465  
 
457. Id. at 441 n.6. 
458. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (italics denote changes made to coincide 
with the Waisbren court’s definition of occupation). 
459. See id. (defining “talent agency”). 
460. But see Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 n.6. 
461. Id. at 442. 
462. Id. at 441; see also discussion supra part I.C.1.a (describing purpose be-
hind the TAA). 
463. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
464. Id. 
465. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing unique role played by per-
sonal managers); see discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing why personal man-
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In most cases, an unlicensed personal manager procures 
employment because no talent agent is willing to represent 
the artist.466  Furthermore, the court ignored the entertain-
ment industry reality that personal managers devote at least 
incidental portions of their time to procuring employment 
for artists.467  Consequently, the court failed to recognize the 
personal manager’s dilemma concerning the procurement of 
employment. 
The court’s assumption that the artist is the victim in ac-
tions under the TAA was similarly meritless.468  Artists initi-
ate most cases to void their management agreements only af-
ter becoming successful, typically to avoid compensating the 
personal manager who helped them develop their careers.469  
These cases often involve TAA violations based on the man-
ager’s failure to comply with the licensing requirement.470  
Such artists seek to void the management agreement on the 
contention that the personal manager has performed talent 
agent functions without a license.471  Thus, the alleged TAA 
violations involve the procurement of employment without 
a license—activities that actually help the artist—rather than 
any action which might harm the artist’s career.472  Conse-
quently, the courts proceeded under an incorrect assump-
tions. 
                                                                                                                                  
agers engage in unlicensed procurement of employment). 
466. Taubman, supra note 44, at 85; Quast, supra note 35, at 203; see also dis-
cussion supra part I.A.1 (describing why talent agents do not represent aspiring 
artists). 
467. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (stating that personal managers engage 
in unlicensed procurement of employment).  The court observed that personal 
managers may be in situations where they would like to procure employment.  
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.  The court’s observation, however, ignored the 
fact that most personal managers must procure employment for their clients.  See 
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3. 
468. Id. at 492; see discussion supra part I.C.1.c (describing harsh penalties 
that may be imposed on personal managers for engaging in unlicensed procure-
ment activities). 
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Additionally, the court incorrectly assumed that the “sig-
nificant part test”473 included a vague and unworkable stan-
dard.474  This Comment contends that there is a workable 
standard behind the “significant part test” and the “inciden-
tal booking exception.”475  The “significant part test” includes 
the same standard as the “incidental booking exception: “476  
unlicensed procurement is permissible if it is incidental to 
the managerial role.477  New York’s regulatory system con-
tains an “incidental booking exception” for personal manag-
ers.478  Furthermore, the New York courts have administered 
the exception with ease.479  Additionally, after Wachs, the 
California Labor Commissioner employed the “significant 
part test” when determining whether a talent agency license 
was necessary for procuring employment.480  Therefore, both 
the “significant part test” and the “incidental booking excep-
tion” are based upon the same workable standard. 
Third, when examining the Labor Commissioner’s inter-
pretation of the TAA, the court ignored instances in which 
the Commissioner permitted unlicensed procurement on an 
incidental basis.481  Consequently, the court incorrectly 
 
473. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (describing the significant part test that 
was adopted in Wachs); see also discussion supra part I.B.3 (describing the center-
of-gravity test that was adopted in Barr). 
474. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
475. But see id. 
476. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing the incidental booking ex-
ception); see also discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental 
booking exception). 
477. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing the incidental booking ex-
ception); see also discussion supra part I.C.1 (describing New York’s incidental 
booking exception). 
478. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental book-
ing exception). 
479. See O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509 (noting that New York courts have had 
little difficulty administering the exception); see also discussion supra part I.D.2 
(describing New York cases that have administered the exception). 
480. See, e.g., Church v. Brown, No. TAC 52-92 (1994); see also Steinberg, su-
pra note 7, at B7 (stating that the Labor Commissioner employed the significant 
part test after Wachs). 
481. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
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stated the Labor Commissioner’s position as requiring a li-
cense for any procurement of employment.482  Prior to the 
Waisbren decision, the Labor Commissioner allowed unli-
censed procurement on an incidental basis.483  In Barr, the 
Labor Commissioner adopted the center-of-gravity test, 
thereby allowing personal managers to participate in em-
ployment negotiations if their primary concern was the art-
ist’s career direction.484  In Wachs, the Labor Commissioner’s 
attorney presented the significant part test to the court to 
support the constitutionality of the TAA.485  Furthermore, af-
ter Wachs, the Labor Commissioner employed the significant 
part test to allow unlicensed procurement of employment 
when it was incidental to the managerial role.486  The Wais-
bren court, however, ignored the Labor Commissioner’s rul-
ings on the interpretation of the TAA that allowed unli-
censed procurement.487  Therefore, the Waisbren court 
incorrectly stated the Labor Commissioner’s position.488 
Finally, the court reasoned fallaciously that the TAA did 
not allow the unlicensed procurement of employment be-
cause it specifically included an exception for working in 
concert with licensed talent agents.489  The court assumed 
that personal managers only incidentally cooperate with li-
 
482. Id. 
483. See supra note 486 and accompanying text (noting that the Labor Com-
missioner employed the significant part test after Wachs). 
484. See discussion supra part I.C.3 (describing the center-of-gravity test that 
was adopted in Barr). 
485. Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7; see discussion supra part II.A.1 
(describing the significant part test that was adopted in Wachs). 
486. See, e.g., Church v. Brown, No. TAC 52-92 (1994); see also Steinberg, su-
pra note 7, at B7 (observing that the Labor Commissioner employed the signifi-
cant part test after Wachs); Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7 (stating that 
after Wachs, the Labor Commissioner’s office employed the significant part test). 
487. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
488. But see id. 
489. See id. at 445 (reasoning that the exception for working with licensed 
agents would be unnecessary if incidental procurement did not require a li-
cense). 
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censed agents,490 and reasoned that the exception for coop-
erating with licensed agents would be unnecessary if the 
TAA allowed the unlicensed procurement of employment 
on an incidental basis.491 
The TAA’s exception for working with licensed agents, 
however, is fully compatible with allowing unlicensed pro-
curement on an incidental basis.492  This exception and the 
“incidental booking exception” are not mutually exclusive 
they can work together.  The TAA’s exception for working 
with talent agents allows personal managers to negotiate 
employment contracts if their efforts are in concert with, and 
at the request of, a licensed agent.493  The “significant part 
test” implicitly contains an “incidental booking exception” 
that allows personal managers to procure employment when 
it is incidental to their managerial role.494  Under the “inci-
dental booking exception,” personal managers can engage in 
procurement activities that are incidental to their managerial 
role.495  Additionally, if a personal manager wants to negoti-
ate employment contracts, and such activities would not fit 
under the incidental booking exception, the manager can sat-
isfy the requirements for working with a licensed agent.496  
In other words, the exception for working with agents al-
lows unlicensed personal managers to negotiate employ-
ment contracts when such efforts are not allowed under the 
 
490. The court reasoned that allowing unlicensed procurement if it was in-
cidental to the managerial role would render the exception for working with 
agents unnecessary.  Id.  However, the court assumed that when personal man-
agers avail themselves of the exception for cooperating with agents, their efforts 
are incidental to their managerial role. 
491. Id. 
492. The TAA could contain both exceptions. 
493. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d).  See discussion supra part I.C.1.b (describ-
ing the exception for working in concert with a licensed talent agent). 
494. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (describing the significant part test); see 
also discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking exception). 
495. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking excep-
tion). 
496. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d). 
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incidental booking exception.497  Thus, the TAA can contain 
an incidental booking exception without rendering the ex-
ception for working with agents superfluous.498 
B. Enacting the PMA Would Be Advantageous to Both 
Personal Managers and Artists 
Personal managers and artists would benefit if the Cali-
fornia Legislature enacted the PMA.499  By recognizing the 
practices of the industry, the PMA:  (1) encourages individu-
als to perform personal management services,500 and (2) pro-
tects the interests of artists employing personal management 
services.501  Adoption of the PMA would be favorable to per-
sonal managers and artists because it would acknowledge 
the realities in the entertainment industry.502 
1. The PMA Protects the Interests of Personal 
Managers and Encourages Individuals to Perform 
Personal Management Services 
Enacting the PMA would encourage individuals to pro-
vide personal management services because the PMA would 
recognize certain realities of the entertainment industry.503  
The PMA recognizes that:  (1) personal managers must pro-
cure employment for artists;504 (2) personal managers endure 
 
497. See id. 
498. But see Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr 2d. at 445. 
499. See discussion supra part II.B.2 (describing how personal managers and 
artists would benefit from the legislature enacting the PMA). 
500. See discussion infra part III.B.1 (describing how the PMA encourages 
individuals to provide personal management services). 
501. See discussion infra part III.B.2 (describing how the PMA protects the 
interests of artists). 
502. Not only does the PMA acknowledge the industry realities, but it in-
cludes provisions which were drafted to remove specific problems currently 
found in the industry. 
503. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing why personal managers en-
gage in procurement efforts on behalf of their clients). 
504. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that personal manag-
ers do procure employment for clients). 
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a higher level of risk than talent agents;505 (3) personal man-
agers have disputes with artists other than those involving 
violations of the TAA;506 (4) the restrictions contained in the 
TAA provide a disincentive for personal managers to obtain 
talent agency licenses;507 and (5) under the TAA, the law was 
ambiguous because it was not consistently enforced.508 
First, the PMA contains an incidental booking exception 
because personal managers do procure employment for art-
ists.509  In their day-to-day activities, personal managers face 
situations in which they must procure employment for art-
ists.510  Under the TAA, personal managers may not procure 
employment without a license.511  Therefore, personal man-
agers often find themselves in the following dilemma:  they 
could engage in unlicensed procurement and risk receiving 
severe penalties from the Labor Commissioner,512 or they 
could subject themselves to the great expense of complying 
with the TAA and the entertainment union regulations.513  
The PMA recognizes that personal managers are called upon 
to procure employment, and allows them to do so on an in-
cidental basis.514 
 
505. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (explaining why personal 
managers endure greater risk than talent agents). 
506. Personal managers and artists have disputes regarding matters other 
than whether the personal manager has obtained a talent agency license. 
507. See discussion supra part I.C.1.b (describing restrictive regulations that 
must be followed pursuant to the TAA). 
508. See discussion supra part I.C.1.d (explaining how the TAA is ambigu-
ous); see also discussion supra part II.A (demonstrating how the TAA has been 
enforced inconsistently). 
509. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that personal manag-
ers do procure employment for clients). 
510. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490. 
511. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (describing the Waisbren holding that 
precludes unlicensed procurement of employment). 
512. See discussion supra part I.C.1.c (explaining the Labor Commissioner’s 
authority to penalize unlicensed procurement efforts). 
513. See discussion supra part I.C.2 (illustrating how entertainment unions 
regulate licensed talent agents). 
514. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking excep-
tion); see also discussion supra part II.B.2 (explicating the PMA). 
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Second, the PMA recognizes that personal managers en-
dure a high level of risk; consequently, it does not restrict 
compensation or the terms of contracts, but rather allows 
managers to obtain equity interests in their clients.515  Per-
sonal managers face a higher level of risk than talent 
agents.516  Because they represent unestablished artists, per-
sonal managers need a longer contract term to receive ade-
quate compensation for their services.517  Furthermore, per-
sonal management services include both personal and 
business concerns.518  Additionally, when representing 
unestablished artists, personal managers are often called 
upon to invest their own money in the artist’s projects.519  
The PMA acknowledges these practical matters and protects 
the personal manager’s freedom to contract for favorable 
provisions.520 
Third, the PMA provides access to inexpensive dispute 
resolution.521  This recognizes the reality that disputes be-
tween personal managers and artists involve issues other 
than violations of the TAA.522  Under the TAA, personal 
managers and artists can employ the Labor Commissioner to 
resolve disputes that involve potential violations of the 
TAA.523  Personal managers and artists, however, often have 
 
515. See supra note 427 and accompanying text (stating that the PMA allows 
personal managers to obtain equity interests in their clients). 
516. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (explaining why personal 
managers endure greater risk than talent agents). 
517. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing why personal 
managers represent unestablished artists). 
518. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (describing the personal 
manager’s role in both personal and business concerns). 
519. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (stating that personal manag-
ers frequently invest in their clients’ projects). 
520. See supra notes 423-27 and accompanying text (describing personal 
manager’s freedom to contract under the PMA). 
521. See supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA 
provides access to inexpensive dispute resolution). 
522. See supra note 506 (explaining that personal managers and artists have 
disputes regarding issue other than unlicensed procurement). 
523. See supra note 408 and accompanying text (stating that the TAA pro-
vides dispute resolution for problems arising under the TAA). 
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disputes that do not involve the TAA.  Presently, they do not 
have access to an inexpensive forum where they can resolve 
such controversies.  The PMA acknowledges this fact and 
authorizes the Labor Commissioner to resolve disputes that 
arise under the PMA.524 
Fourth, because the PMA would contain fewer compli-
ance costs than the TAA, less people would be deterred from 
becoming personal managers.525  The significant compliance 
costs associated with the TAA is one reason why personal 
managers do not obtain talent agency licenses.526  Instead, 
the PMA limits the restrictions placed on personal managers 
and keeps the cost of compliance very low.527  Thus, the 
PMA does not deter people from providing personal man-
agement services. 
Finally, the PMA contains a statement describing the per-
sonal manager’s required conduct.528  This pronouncement 
helps avoid the ambiguity that surrounded the judiciary’s 
inconsistent enforcement of the TAA.529  The TAA included 
the ambiguous term, “procurement,”530 which left reasonable 
people guessing whether they had violated the licensing re-
quirement.531  Additionally, the Labor Commissioner and 
courts did not consistently enforce the TAA.532  In Barr, the 
 
524. See supra note 409 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA pro-
vides access to inexpensive dispute resolution). 
525. See supra notes 414-22 and accompanying text (describing how the PMA 
would contain fewer restrictions than the TAA). 
526. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 491. 
527. See supra note 422 and accompanying text (explaining that the PMA 
does not deter individuals from becoming personal managers). 
528. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA de-
scribes the personal manager’s required conduct). 
529. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text (explaining the definitive 
statement provided by the PMA). 
530. See discussion supra part I.C.1.d (describing the ambiguity that sur-
rounded the term “procurement”). 
531. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497. 
532. See discussion supra part II.A (discussing conflicting interpretations of 
the TAA). 
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Labor Commissioner employed a center-of-gravity test.533  In 
Wachs, the court adopted the significant part test.534  In Wais-
bren, the court rejected the significant part test in favor of a 
rule that prohibited any unlicensed procurement of em-
ployment.535  Conversely, the PMA would avoid ambiguity 
and inconsistency by including a definitive statement of the 
personal manager’s required conduct.  This would remove 
many of the TAA’s shortcomings and would encourage in-
dividuals to become personal managers. 
2. The PMA Protects Artists’ Interests and 
Encourages Artists to Engage the Services of 
Personal Managers 
In addition to helping personal managers, enacting the 
PMA would also protect artists’ interests by recognizing cer-
tain entertainment industry realities.536  The PMA acknowl-
edges that:  (1) artists need personal managers to procure 
employment on their behalf;537 (2) artists have disputes with 
personal managers other than those involving violations of 
the TAA;538 and (3) the Labor Commissioner should be au-
thorized to terminate management agreements when the 
manager is not providing his best efforts.539 
First, the PMA contains an incidental booking exception 
because artists need personal managers to engage in the pro-
 
533. See discussion supra part I.C.3 (illustrating the Labor Commissioner’s 
use of the center-of-gravity test). 
534. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (describing the adoption of the signifi-
cant part test). 
535. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (explaining the rejection of the signifi-
cant part test). 
536. If the legislature enacts the PMA, artists will be protected better than 
under the TAA alone. 
537. This is particularly true in the case of an aspiring artist who is unable to 
gain the representation of a talent agent.  Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490. 
538. See supra note 506 and accompanying text (explaining that artists have 
disputes with personal managers that do not concern the TAA). 
539. See supra note 426 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA author-
izes the Labor Commissioner to terminate a contract when the personal manager 
has failed to provide his best efforts). 
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curement of employment.540  Aspiring artists employ the 
services of a personal manager before they can gain the rep-
resentation of a talent agent.541  Without an agent, artists are 
forced to rely on personal managers for procurement of em-
ployment.542  The PMA acknowledges this fact and allows 
personal managers to procure employment for artists on an 
incidental basis.543 
Second, the PMA provides artists with access to inexpen-
sive dispute resolution for controversies with personal man-
agers.544  Presently, artists and personal managers do not 
have a forum where they can resolve disputes involving is-
sues other than violations of the TAA.  The PMA recognizes 
the importance of inexpensive dispute resolution and au-
thorizes the Labor Commissioner to provide artists and 
managers with such a mechanism.545 
Finally, the PMA authorizes the Labor Commissioner to 
terminate a management contract when personal managers 
do not put forth their best efforts, because there is no limit 
on the terms of management contracts.546  Artists may be 
vulnerable to personal managers who control their ca-
reers.547  This risk may be increased under the PMA because 
it provides personal managers with greater freedom to con-
 
540. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that personal manag-
ers need to procure employment on behalf of artists). 
541. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (explaining why aspiring 
artists employ personal management services before talent agency services). 
542. Artists find it difficult to procure employment on their own behalf. 
543. See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA 
contains an incidental booking exception). 
544. See supra notes 403-09 and accompanying text (describing why the PMA 
provides inexpensive dispute resolution). 
545. See supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA 
provides access to inexpensive dispute resolution). 
546. See supra note 426 and accompanying text (stating that the PMA pro-
vides the Labor Commissioner with the authority to terminate contracts when 
the personal manager is not rendering his best efforts). 
547. See supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text (noting that the personal 
nature of the relationship might lead an artist to be vulnerable to the personal 
manager who is controlling the artist’s career). 
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tract.548  The PMA, however, alleviates this risk by authoriz-
ing the Labor Commissioner to terminate contracts when 
personal managers do not provide their best efforts to fulfill 
their managerial obligations. 
By realizing how the TAA interferes with their interests, 
the PMA is able to increase the protection afforded to artists. 
CONCLUSION 
Personal managers provide invaluable services to the as-
piring artist.  Unable to obtain representation from talent 
agents, aspiring artists often turn to personal managers for 
guidance and career development.  Both artists and manag-
ers cooperate to increase the artists’ chances for success.  By 
procuring employment, personal managers, however, may 
be subject to the TAA.  The California Court of Appeals have 
disagreed over the TAA’s application to personal managers.  
A personal manager, who does not have a talent agent’s li-
cense, may receive harsh punishment from the Labor Com-
missioner for any involvement in procuring employment for 
an artist.  The unique services that a personal manager pro-
vides cannot be found elsewhere in the entertainment indus-
try.  Enactment of a Personal Managers Act will regulate 
personal managers.  Subjecting personal managers to the 
TAA places a burdensome obligation on managers.  To pre-
vent the problems created by recent judicial decisions, and 
still protect artists, the California legislature should enact a 




548. See supra notes 414-22 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
PMA provides personal managers with greater freedom to contract). 
